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.The research explores the. causal relationship between 
market share and profitability arid is specifically aimed 
at understanding the factors that affect the "strength of 
this relationship, and the mechanisms that cause the 
relationship. %
The research initially utilised a data base of over 100 
South African SBUs with information in the "PIMS Limited 
5 Information, Model" format. The relationship between 
market share and profitability was explored using 
ordinary least squares regression analysis and the slope 
of the line was found to be significantly lower than that 
of the quoted PIMS studies. Cluster analysis was used on 
the environmental variables to produce clusters of 
similar environments and regression analysis again done 
on market share and profitability to test whether the 
correlation between profitability and market share was 
stronger or weaker i n ; the different environmental 
\ settings. _ Significant differences wOre found in, the 
correlations and one particular environment was found;to 
exhibit a : relationship between market share rind 
profitability that was significantly stronger than all 
other environmental settings. A fine grained methodology 
was developed to determine the cause of the correlation 
for this environment. This initial study led to the 
causal relationship between market share and 
profitability being explained for the SBUs concerned.
The results of the initial study were then extended using 
intuition, logic and some accepted concepts from the 
literature into a new generalised theory, and some 
working hypotheses were formulated. A methodology for 
testing the hypotheses using the remaining SBUs in the 
data base was developed. The results supported the 
~ hypotheses and hence the theory. \ \
In summary the theory proposes the following:
L> Market share is-" a measure of the relative size, of a 
business with respect to other participants in the 
served market, but is not a measiire of relative size 
elsewhere in the value chain.
2. The profitability of a business is dictated by a 
limited number "of critical variables or processes 
(key success factors) which may occur anywhere in 
the firm's value chain.
3. Some of the KSFs,are subject to advantages of scale
,V (in the broadest sense) and others are not subject"
to advantages of scale. 1
4. In some SBUs KSFs apply only to the industry that is
being considered and are therefore specific to that
t- business. ,
„ ' rj " - ' - " - ?
5. In other SBUs KSFS apply to a number of different 
businesses in different industries and are therefore
" not specific to the industry under consideration.
6 . The theory predicts the following:
Hi
Advantages
of
Scale
Lo
Low causal 
relationship 
between 
share and 
profit |j
High causal 
relationship 
between 
share and 
profit
No causal relationship 
between share and profit
Lo fSpeCificity Hi
The research findings ' support the theoretical 
propositions made above, , Thereafter some of the 
implications for strategy formulation were explored. It 
ii argued |that a contingency approach is required 
(dependent on advantages of scale and specificity) and 
that this has far reaching consequences for some existing 
Strategic planning concepts. Itnls also airgned that the 
research has practical applicability,. By employing the 
research methodology the quadrant in which a business 
operates could be diagnosed, and therefore the nature of 
the causal relationship between market share and 
profitability predicted: This could lead to
significantly different strategies Compared to those 
dictated by conventional strategic planning concepts.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBJECT
Economic theory has been obsessed with the quelstion of 
relative size since the Industrial Revolution. As 
mankind has advanced in technology, production units 
have become bigger and moire complex and, with the
advances, more efficient.; In parallel with this, and
possibly as a result of this process, the notion has
grown that the scale of operation (especially scale 
” relative to competitors) is Critical for obtaining 
efficiencies and hence competitive advantage. Ini short 
the assumption that "bigger is better" has over many 
years ingrained itself in economic and management
thinking. This view continued unchallenged until the 
late 1970s when the concept was first seriously 
challenged.1 The view was put forward that technology 
„had advanced to the extent that it was again possible to 
make things small and still be efficient. Today there 
’ are many schools of thought concerning this topic? and 
many empirical studies have been undertaken, yet no 
universally acceptable conclusion has been reached.
At the heart of the debate lies the relationship between 
market share _ and profitability. This has been 
researched and reported on by many authors and in almost 
all cases a positive correlation between market share 
and profitability has been found. This, coupled with 
some theoretical logic, led researchers to believe that 
there was a causal relationship between market share and 
profitability. However, more recent research projects 
using sophisticated statistical techniques on an 
extensive data base have thrown doubt /on this and have 
proposed that the relationship between market share and 
profitability is largely spurious and is at best weaker 
than was previously supposed.
The debate can be traced back to the 1930s when the 
structure - conduct - performance theory was first put
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forward. An eluent of structure that was investigated 
was industry concentration (which relates to market= " - 0  P .  '"c
share) and -which was found to be correlated with 
profitability (Bain,. 1951) . This view remained in the 
' | field of Industrial Organisation for many years, while,
in parallel from the field of Business icy the view 
developed that it was market share, notUconcentration, 
which accounted for the correlation of size with 
profitability. , Various theories' were put forward for 
the correlation, including advantages of scale (popular 
in microeconomics), learning curvi. and experience curve 
effects (popularized by the Boston Consultancy. Group) 
and monopolistic - pricing (popular in the fields of 
Industrial Organisation and microeconomics) . The first 
of the PIUS (Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy) 
studies in the early 70s confirmed the correlation 
between market-share and profitability (Buzzell, Gale 
and Sultan, 1975) and later showed that it was market 
share and not industry concentration which accounted for 
the correlation that had been observed (Gale, 1982).
Up to this point all serious studies had concluded that 
"big" was "better" and that higher market share was a 
highly desirable strategic goal. However in the late 
70s and early 80s the profitability of small market 
share companies was studied and found to be 
significantly better than the//1 theory- predicted. 
Specifically the work of Woo and Cooper (1982) showed 
that low market share companies can be successful 
provided correct strategic choices are made. Also, 
other authors examined the relationship between market 
share and profitability in a wider context and concluded 
that the correlation was largely epuri'&jtg. an'*£rhat the 
direct effect of market share on profitability was much 
less than had previously been estimated. (e.g. Rumelt 
& Wensley, 1981). ' -
As stated above, the debate still continues with many 
schools of thought havihg been formed in the interim,
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?. A more complete and detailed review of the literature is
given in chapter 2 but suffice it to Say that no single 
a school of thought is universally accepted. One of the
reasons for the amount of research that has been devoted 
to the question is. that the result has profound 
practical (arid philosophical) implications. If a 
strong, universally applicable, causal relationship 
between market share and prof itability, existed, then the 
strategies of businessmen and women would have to 
reflect an aggressive market share gaining approach. 
This would result in a zero-sum game where one player's 
gain is another player's loss and a "dog eat dog" type 
competitive climate. It would also result in things 
- becoming bigger and bigger and more and more complex as 
people strived for the ultimate scale advantage-. If, on 
the other hand, there were no causal relationship 
between market share and profitability, it would mean 
that there would be no fundamental reason why low market 
share companies could not be as successful and 
~ profitable as large market share companies. This would 
clearly result in a completely different competitive 
environment, where small simple units could be stable 
and profitable and where growth strategies would be an 
option rather than a requirement.
The debate has grown beyond the realms of Business 
Strategy into the arena Of economic philosophy. In the 
view of Schumacher (1979, p21)
"We have all been brainwashed by the experience of 
the nineteenth century, when, probably, the 
f technological immaturity was such that it was true 
to say, 'The bigger the better' : only on a large 
scale can you get the economics Of scale . But that 
was a very immature technology. Now this is no 
longer true. Today we have enough technology and 
scientific knowledge to make things small again".
This research is aimed at making a. contribution to the
A
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debate in the narrower and the broader sense. Initially 
the focus is narrow with the debate centring around the 
statistical correlation between market share and 
profitability. Later the theory is generalized and the 
broader implication for strategy and strategic thinking 
.. » ' are discussed. ' g- ji1 } ' y
1.2 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH
Today there are many schools of thought regarding the 
desirability of high market share, which manifest 
themselves as ^ opposing -trends in the market place. For 
example, on the one hand there is the trend towards 
globalizing market share and the preoccupation of the 
Japanese with market share, while on the other hand 
there is the trend that major corporations are 
exhibiting (in the USA and South Africa) to "unbundle" 1 
and break themselves up into smaller autonomous units.
%While ^ some corporations strive to achieve a dominant 
position in the world market, there is a growing 
understanding of the importance of the "informal sector" 
where businesses of minute size make a significant 
contribution to growth and employment.
All of the above have at their root some base assumption 
concerning market share and profitability. After more 
^ t h a n  fifty years of thinking that "big is better" the 
tide is turning and the "small is beautiful" school of 
thought is in the ascendency. However the relative 
merits of the cases still largely speaking remain 
unanswered. Is there a causal relationship between 
market share and profitability? Does high market share 
provide the holder with inherent competitive advantage? 
If so, how? Also, under what conditions is the effect 
of market share on profitability strong and under what 
conditions is it weak? 'Clearly these are questions with 
practical as well as theoretical significance and are 
highly relevant in today's economic climate. '
CHAPTER, lo INTRODUCTION ^ PAGE 5
Also, ; a number of widely accepted concepts from the 
strategic planning literature (e.g. Boston Consulting 
Group Portfolio Grid) have assumptions concerning the 
relationship between market share and profitability 
inherent in their functioning. These concepts and their 
inherent assumptions are reviewed in more detail in 
section 2.1.2 and 2.1.4.
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
,v The main theme of the research is centred around market
share, its effect on profitability and the implications 
for strategy formulation. Specific questions relating 
to this central theme are:
' a) Is the correlation between market share and
profitability universal or are there certain 
environmental or structural criteria which must be 
met for the correlation to exist?
Is the correlation equally strong in all 
industries? ,
Is there a single mechanism whereby market share 
affects profitability or are there many different 
mechanisms? ' v \ /
Is there a causal relationship between market share 
and profitability or does the relationship depend 
on a spurious third factor? If so, what factor (s) ?
Once the above questions have been answered, what 
implications does this have for strategy 
formulation?
These are the central issues which the research process 
has been designed to address. The objective of the 
research is to address these questions within the 
context of South African business.
b)
c)
d) 
«)
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1.4 KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Conceptually this research is made up of 6  major phases.
Phase I /Literature Survey ° .
Phase II ' Statistical analysis of an existing data base 
Phase/III Fine grained study into causality 
Phase IV Generalization of theory r>
Phase V Fine grained test of theory
Phase VI Conclusions and implications for strategy.
(These phases are described in more detail in Chapter
' C 3). ' - y
A limitation of the research is that the data analyzed 
in phase II is limited to 103 SSUs from a small number 
of industries within the South African business 
environment. Also the available data was in the P1MS 
Limited format which means there were a reduced number 
ofvariables available for analysis. A further 
limitation is that the data was not drawn on a random 
basis (or any systematic, sample scheme) and therefore 
cannot be taken as being representative of South African 
business at large. Therefore the results of this phase 
of the research also cannot b"e taken to be 
representative of South African business at large but 
must be interpreted with the above limitation in mind, 
(The data is described in more detail in chapter 4) . 
Fortunately this limitation is not critical for the 
other phases of the research because the fine grained 
studies are by their very nature much more limited in 
scope.
In analysing the data base in phase II of the research 
only a single year's data is available and it is assumed 
that this was representative of the SBUs concerned, 
j i  (During the collection of the data normally two to three
(j years of profit information was obtained and a check
J\ made to ensure that the year in question was not out of
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line, so this assumption seems reasonable). Also, the 
time taken to collect the original data extended over 
3 years and the data could derive from information from | 
1982 to 1984. This is assumed not to have added a major 
source of tyariance 1 Another key assumption is that when 
the fine grained studies were done (1988 to 1991) it was 
Assumed that no major structural changes had taken place 
and that for individual SBUs the causal mechanism or 
reason for market shares' influence on profitability had 
not changed in the interim. Wherever possible this 
^assumption was checked explicitly and this resulted in 
some of the SBUs being eliminated from the fine grained 
studies in phases H I  and Vv 0
Other assumptions relating to specific phases of the 
project are specified in the chapters concerned. For 
example, the theory generalization in chapter 7 gives a 
detailed statement of the assumptions needed for the 
generalization of the theory.
- ' ■ ■ ■ "  ■ ■ '  -■ a •■■■' . -
1.5 DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
In general, the concepts and terminology used in this 
thesis are used in accordance with accepted definitions 
and usages as used in most strategic planning text 
books. Where particular definitions are important or a 
particular narrow interpretation is required the concept 
is defined in the text. Definitions occur to a major 
extent in chapter 2  (with reference to usage in the 
literature), chapter 4 (where definitions relating to 
the data base are specified) and chapter 7 (where 
definitions relating to the theoretical concepts are 
specified). v
For ease of reference, an Index including definitions is 
provided at the end of*the report.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION PAGES
1.6 OUTLINE OP CHAPTERS
Chapter 2 gives a review of the literature pertaining to 
market share and prof itability. The chapter starts with 
a brief historical overview and introduction to the 
concepts then moves on to review studies supporting a 
positive,^ causal relationship between market share and 
profitability. These studies mostly utilize the PIMS 
data base but other evidence is also presented. 
Thereafter studies not supporting a causal relationship 
between market share and profitability are presented. 
Again most of the studies utilize the PIMS data base but 
again other evidence is also presented. Largely 
"speaking, all of the studies presented in the above two 
sections were static, cross sectional studies. Section
2.4 presents some longitudinal studies which relate to 
market share and profitability. Thereafter the 
contributions from microeconomics and Industrial 
Organisation are reviewed with special reference to game. 
theory. Finally, some industry studies and case studies 
are very superficially reviewed.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the research methodology 
and puts the phases of the research in context. The 
chapter starts by introducing the classical research 
process and comparing this to the process followed in 
this thesis., The concept of a hybrid methodology is put 
forward and an explanation given as to how this is used 
in the phases of the research. The generality of the 
various phases of the research is then discussed and Phe 
chapter closes with a comment on research paradigms.
Chapter 4 is the start of phase II of the research and 
gives a complete description of the data base employed 
and of the South African business environment at the 
time of data capture. a
Chapter 5 completes phase II of the research with a
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description of the methodology and results of the 
statistical analysis of th6 data.
Chapter 6 (phase III) gives a complete description of' 
the initial investigation done into SBUs that were found 
to have a high correlation between market share and 
profitability. The chapter covers the methodology, the 
field work and the results of the investigation. The 
8 results are discussed arid at the end of the chapter some 
conclusions are drawn.
Chapter 7 (phase IV) covers the generalization of the 
theory. Firstly the theoretical concepts are discussed 
and defined, then the necessary assumptions are stated 
and thereafter the theoretical postulates are stated. 
These are discussed, developed into hypotheses, and 
justified on a theoretical basis. Then the results from 
chapter 6 are discussed with reference to the 
o theoretical framework developed and some conclusions 
drawn.
Chapter 8 represents the start of phase V of the 
research and gives a description of the methodology 
employed in testing the hypotheses developed in chapter
7. ■■■„
Chapter 9 represents the end of phase V of the research 
and gives a description of the field work and the 
results obtained. A detailed analysis of the results 
are given.
Chapter 10 represents the last phase of the research and 
covers the implications for strategy formulation. The 
chapter starts by extending the theoretical concepts and 
then discusses a new paradigm suggested by the 
methodology of the research prpcess. Thereafter the 
implications for strategy formulation are discussed and 
the consistency of the theory with other theoretical 
concepts from the literature is examined. The chapter
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also covers the limitations Of the study, possible 
future studies, the contribution to knowledge made by 
the research and ends with some concluding remarks.
O',
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
'   "r '
This chapter presents an overview of the literature pertaining 
to market share and the relationship between market share arid 
profitability^ The literature available on the subject is 
extensive and stems from a number of different disciplines 
with differing basic paradigms. The differences and breadth of 
focus in the literature is both enlightening and> at the same 
time confusing; enlightening because many of the key issues 
are discussed from a number of totally different perspectives, 
but confusing in that the lack of a common basic paradigm 
makes comparisons difficult and therefore contradictions are 
not easily resolved.
The rest of this section gives a brief historical overview and 
then moves on to a discussion of the basic paradigms 
encountered in the literature and the definition of key 
concepts. The importance of the relationship between market 
share and profitability in the literature is discussed at the 
end of the section. „
The review of the literature is then split into two opposing 
camps. Section 2.2 reviews the literature supporting a 
causal, positive relationship between market share and profit 
and section 2.3 reviews literature not supporting this 
relationship. Broadly speaking, but with some exceptions, 
sections 2.2 and 2.3 review literature based on the PIMS data 
base. At the end of section 2.3 the difficulties regarding 
comparisons are highlighted when the use of explanatory 
variables in models designed for similar purposes are 
compared. Most of the models reviewed in section 2.2 and 2.3 
are static cross-sectional models.}
Section 2.4 differs from ttie preceding sections in that a 
dynamic element is introduced and literature focusing on 
change in market share, order of entry and longitudinal models 
is reviewed.
/?
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Section 2,5 reviews the relevant literature from the fields of 
Microeconomics and Industrial Organisation. Here, once again, 
the volume of literature available is enormous, and an attempt 
has been made to review only the concepts central to the main 
„theme of this research. Section 2.6 covers some of the 
specific contributions from the Game Theory literature.
Section 2  .7 gives a brief and by no means exhaustive review of 
the more striking examples of industry studies > case studies 
and anecdotal evidence from the literature. . V
Although the chapter is split into sections as indicated 
above, these are by no means watertight# and there is some 
overlap and duplication which could hot be avoided.
In presenting the literature, no attempt has been made to 
discredit one body of literature or defend another. Where 
appropriate, criticism has been levelled at a particular 
author, pointing out weaknesses in methodology or in analysis 
-but this has been minimised in Order tb present an unbiased 
base for the research.
/  ’ ■ ' n2.1.1 Historical Overview
|  " r
The debate on the relationship between market share and
profitability has a long and distinguished history I
stretching as far back as the 1930s and enjoying the
attention of many of the foremost authors of our time.
The debate developed from the strueture^conduct-
performance theory which was first put forward in the
early 1930s. The earliest empirical tests done by Bain
(1951) proposed a relationship between industry
concentration and profitability. This thinking has been
carried through to the present day in the field of
Industrial ‘organisation. A study by Buzzell Gale and
Sultan (1975) using the'PIMS data^base showed that there
was a strong correlation between market share and
profitability. A later study by Gale and Branch (1982) {
addressed the question of whether it was concentrationf
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or market share that accounted for the relationship with 
/ =prbfitaMlity. Gales' study showed that oncer the effect 
of market share was taken into account the^relatidnship 
between concentration ; and profitahility rtwas 
; statistically insignificant. This confirmed work done 
, by Shepherd (1972) and Gale (1972). The proposition 
that higher market- share resulted in higher 
profitability was put forward and supported by the 
„ growing body of knowledge on the experience curve which7 
" was developed by the Boston Consulting Group during the 
196Os and 1970s (Henderson, 1979;. However, causality 
in the relationship of market share and profitability 
was never proved to the satisfaction of all concerned. 
Alio abundant examples exist of low market share firms 
which are highly profitable. Some of these were 
investigated by Woo and Cooper (1981) and this plus 
other evidence led scholars to question whether 
universal laws could be true in the strategy arena where 
every situation is,at least slightly different to every 
other situation. This led to the formulation of so- 
called mid-range theories with "laws" which are 
contingent on external environmental typologies (eg.
Hambrick 1983c; Galbraith and Schendel 1983}.
' % - ' ' A
’ • • f  ■ ”
It is not the author's intention, to give a detailed 
„ account of the1 history of the debate but father to pick­
up the fundamental themes and results from the various 
approaches. Numerous authors have reviewed the history 
of the debate and made comparisons for their own 
particular purposes. For example, Cook (1985) reviews 
20 major works^  over the period 1962 to 1983 and rates 
them on a common framework so that differences in 
approach and results can be highlighted. Other authors 
(for example Bothwell, Cooley and Hall, 1984; Bass, 
Cattin and Wittink, 1978; Ramanujam and Venkatraman, 
1984; Varadarajan and Dillon, 1981; Shepherd, 1972) give 
wide ranging reviews of the literature before drawing on 
narrower ranges to make specific points. As will be 
shown in more detail later in this chapter, the
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literature is" by no means" unified in approach, 
methodology or in results. in fact there exist a number 
of different basic paradigms which dictate the approach 
of various authors and in some cases lead to 
diametrically opposing results. For example Prescott, 
Kohli and Venkatraman (1996) reviewed the literature and 
found 2 major assertions and 3 major contradictions all 
with key supporting literattire. V  <-
2.1.2 Paradigms "
One reason for the contradictions that exist in the 
literature as well as for the sheer volume of literature 
that exists on the subject is, that various authors have 
approached the problem from differing basic 
perspectives. It is an accepted fact that no single, 
central research paradigm exists in the strategy area 
(Montgomery, 1998). Certainly, in the discussion of 
market share and profitability authors have approached 
the subject from (at least) the following perspectives:
a) Microeconomics & Industrial Organisation
b) Game Theory
c) .Business, Policy, Marketing and Strategy
d) Emperical studies, case studies and industry 
studies
%
Table 2.1 Gives some examples of work done by various 
authors in the above categories.
In a number of cases the difference in approach leads to 
considerable differences in conclusions and in some 
cases outright contradictions.
Although table 2.1 conveniently categorises the papers 
into four sections', the differences between the 
categories are by no means clear cut or explicitly 
stated by the authors. Many authors employ two or more 
basic paradigms and, if anything, it would appear that
a
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the basic approaches' are moving closer together, over 
■,r time and that the distinction between them is becoming 
more blurred.
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rBasic Theoretical Roots Examples
Micro economics^and 
Industrial Organisation
' ' I"' -
Bain, 1951 -
Caves, Gail -and Porter,; 1977 
Cook, 1985
Dolan &  Jeuland, 1981
Geroski, Masson & Shaanan, 1987 (
Lippman & Rumelt, 1982
McGee, 1988 °
Pickering, 1974 
Porter, 1984, 1990 
Rad and Bass, 1985 
Schmalensee, 1981 
Scherer, 1980
Shepherd, 1972 ' z 
Weiss, 1989 "
„ Game theory Wemerfelt, 1984; 1985; 1986 
Carpenter & Lehmann, 1985 
Kamani, 1983; 1984 „ 
McGuire & Weiss, 1976 
Mills, 1961 '
Eaton and Ware, 1987 r 
Ucheda, 1978 ; 0 
Basar & Olsder, 1982 „
Weigelt & MacMillan, 1988 
Fundenburg, 1984 1 n
Business Policy, 
Marketing & Strategy
" 0. ' . ■ 
r ■
Buzzell, Gale & Sultan, 1975 \ 
Buzzell & Wiersenia, 1981 « x 
Bloom & Kotler, 1975 
Cowley, 1988
Hambrick, 1983a; 1983b; 1983c 
Hambrick, MacMillan & Day, 1982 
Hamermesh, Anderson & Harris,
1978 ?
Harrigan, 1980 
Kotler, 1980 
Woo, 1983; 1984; 1987 
Woo & Cooper, 1981; 1982
Empirical studies, case 
studies, industry 
studies and anecdotal
Page, 1979
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988
Lytle, 1982
Newton, 1983
Shaw & Shaw, 1984
Smirlock, 1985
Schuster, 1984
Thackray, 1984
Table 2.1 Basic Paradigms
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5 The four categories can be viewed as two major 
Categories each with two subsets. The first is the 
,Industrial'Organisation approach which is typified 
by Scherer (1980) and McGee M988) and has, as a 
basis, the classical approach which was developed 
from microeconomics theory by Edward S Mason during 
the 1930s (Scherer, 1980, p.4). According to this 
approach performance in a particular industry is 
said to depend on the conduct of sellers and buyers 
(for example pricing behaviour, advertising# plant 
investment, etc). Conduct depends in turn upon 
market structure which according to Shepherd (1972) 
includes elements like market share, leading firm 
concent rat ion ratio, advertising intensity, entry 
barriers, growtlf rate, etc. Market structure and 
conduct are also- influenced by various basic 
conditions which include supply conditions (such as 
product durability, value/weight, unionisation, 
technology) and demand conditions (such as price 
elasticity, substitutes, rate of growth, 
seasonality, purchase mfethod) , This basic
conditions-market structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm provides the theme for all Industrial 
Organisation approaches. It also is the underlying 
paradigm behind most applications of Game Theory to 
market share/profitability questions. Industrial 
organisation economists have traditionally focused 
on explaining differences in the average 
i )  profitability of Industries rather than individual 
businesses. The objective of Industrial
Organisation is often to define economic policy 
rather than to act as a guide to managers of
individual businesses. It is instructive to note 
that "good industrial performance" is defined
(Scherer, 1980, pp.3-4) as satisfying four goals, 
viz. efficient decision as to what and how much to
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produce; progressive use of technology; stable"and 
r full employment of resources; and., lastly, the 
distribution of income should be equitable. - oir
In contrast, the other basic approach is that of 
business policy or business strategy. While it is 
_ true to say that there is no single research 
paradigm that is accepted by everyone in this field, 
one typical paradigm is the 'PIMS' approach as put 
forward by Buzzell and Gale which they refer to as 
; “ the PIMS Competitive Strategy Paradigm (Buzzell and 
Gale, 1987 p.28) . According to this approach 
performance is determined by strategy (which 
. includes pricing, R & D spending, new product 
introductions, quality and variety of 
products/services, marketing expenses, etc.). 
Strategy in turn is jointly dependent on market 
structure and competitive position.
The two basic paradigms are graphically represented 
in figure 2.1 and 2.2.
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Fig 2.1 - Basic Industrial Organisation Paradigm
(Source : Scherer, 1980,' p.4)
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Market Structure' Strategy & Tactics
Competitive Position
EXHIBIT 2-3
The PIMS Competitive Strategy Paradigm
. •  Relative perceived quality
•  Relative market share
•  Relative capital Intensity r
•  Relative cost
»  Market differentiation
•  Market growth rale
•  Entry conditions
•  Unionization»
•  Capital Intensity
•  Purchase amount
e Profitability (ROS, ROI, etc.) 
e Growth 
a Cash flow 
# Value enhancement
•  Stock price
•  Pricing
* -
•  R&D spending
•  New product Introductions
•  Change In relative quality 
and variety of 
products/services
•  Marketing expenses
•  Distribution channels
•  Relative vertical integration
N ote: Unit o f analysis =  business unit and its served market.
Fig 2.2 - The basic PIMS Competitive Strategy Paradigm
(Source : Buzzell and Gale, 1987, p.28)
The contrast and similarities between the Industrial 
Organisation (10) paradigm and the Pirns Competitive 
Strategy Paradigm (PIMS) can be clearly seen by 
comparing Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The major point of 
difference which is significant to this research is 
that the PIMSc approach aims at producing* practical 
advice for individual business managers based on the 
analysis of past strategies of other businesses. A 
basic assumption of the PIMS approach is that there 
are "general relationships that can provide valuable 
guidance to managers" (Buzzell & Gale, 1987, p.6).
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ThiS view has drawn criticism from some authors of 
business policy who claim that" there can be no 
° = universal laws in the field of business strategy 
because every situation is \inique. Lubatki^And 
Pitts (1985) compare the "policy peropective" to the 
"PIMS perspective" and point out that no two 
- businesses are exactly alike and therefore there can 
be few, if any, formulas for achieving competitive 
advantage. Lubatkin and Pitts go on to report on a 
longitudinal study done on the brewing industry from 
1952 to 1974. They claim that "while the PIMS model 
may provide good competitive information, industry- 
specific models may be able to provide better 
information" (Lubatkin & Pitts, 1985, p.91).
10 and PIMS not only differ in their basic paradigms 
but also differ in the methodology used to advance 
their theories. 10 tends to rely heavily "on 
rigorous mathematical logic, and thus moves easily 
cn to game theory, derivations from perfect 
competition and decision theory, r The approach 
usually adopted is to derive logically consistent 
(highly complicated) mathematical models of the 
phenomenon being investigated and then to assume 
special Cases for the parameters of the equation to 
demonstrate the workings of the model. PIMS, on the 
other, hand has been criticised for statistical 
combing of the data base, the use of cross-sectional 
analysis of non-homogeneous data, and the use of
/(' . 'I
multiple linear regression where causality is not
logically implied. While some of these criticisms
are no doubt applicable to some PIMS studies,
»
efforts have been made in the more recent studies to 
avoid these problems.
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2.1.3 Definition of Central Concepts !
Before the literature is reviewed in more detail, 
some discussion of the central concepts is required 
to facilitate a more precise understanding and usage 
later on in the chapter. "
Market Share » -,'n
/ - p O' ■ ' %
In most 10 studies market share is defined as;
. - n' " .
MSi = Yi / r Yi „ » ’ - :
" i=! ' ' ” ■:
where MSi = the market share of the ith firm 
• Yi = the output of the ith fiijmi.
If not defined„ in terms of output then the 
equivalent definition is made in terms of value (see 
for example Bass et al, 1978, p. 9) .
- This is the accurate, mathematical definition of 
market share defined as the firms output divided by 
the industry output. It, of course, presupposes an 
accurate and accepted definition of the industry 
(firms 1 to n) and that each firm views its business
CO ' . ' !' '
in the same way.
The PIMS approach differs significantly in that it 
staSrts with the definition of the business!as "an 
operating unit that: I 1
• , sells a distinct, set of products and services
• | to an identifiable group of customers |
•i ; in competition with a well-defined set of 
; competitors." ; I! x
v (Abell and Hammond, 1979, p.273)
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The PIMS 'definition ofimarket share is then given
-"J,' - ,
as: (Schdeffler, Buzzell & Heany, 1974, p.140)
, "The ratio of dollar sales by a business> in a 
given7 time period to total sale# by all 
competitors in the same market. The 'market' 
includes all of the products or services, 
customer types, and geographic areas that are 
directly related to the activities of the 
business. For example, it includes all 
products and services that are competitive 
with those sold by the business".
As pointed * out by Abell (1980) the way that 
management defines its business is a matter of 
choice and is !i of the - greatest strategic 
significance. The PIMS definitions make use of 
management's interpretation of 'served market' and 
hence of market share. Day (1983, p.54) criticises 
the PIMS approach on the basis that the analysis 
assumes there is only-xone relevant definition of 
market boundaries that gives an adequate picture of 
11 the overall competitive standing of the business or 
of the relationship of market, share and 
profitability. While this criticism undoubtedly has 
merit, clearly for analytical purposes one 
definition is required and for strategy purposes the 
PIMS approach is the preferred option.
Performance
„ ^ As discussed in section 2.1.2, the 10 definition of 
good performance involves macro measures such as 
efficiency of output decision, progress, full 
employment of resources and equity: in contrast the
PIMS definition of performance (Buzzell and Gale,
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1987,q p.28) is narrowly 
performjince and includes r
defined as business unit 
eturn on investment (ROD ,
return on sales (Ros), growth, cash flow,^v^-lue 
enhancement arid stock pricie. Most PIMS stupes (and 
many other studies,) use ROI as the only measure of
performance. Gale arid Branch (1982, p.92) to some 
extent justified this -view by showing that in a
study using the PIMS, data base ROI was highly 
correlated with return jp n  sales, return on equity 
and cash flow to investment. Nevertheless, in an 
earlier paper (Gale & Branch, 1981), they pointed 
out that cash flow is an extremely important 
performance measure in its own right. Some authors 
have found it necessary to use more than one 
performance measure (see Cook, 1985) while others 
(eg. Bourgeois, 1985, p.559) use a single composite 
measure obtained by applying factor analysis to a 
number of conventional performance measures. Again, 
there appears to be no single universally acceptable 
measure of performance but where a single measure is 
used, ROI appears to be the"most acceptable.
Strategy '
If there iis some debate on the precise definition of
market share and performance in the literature this
is dwarfed by the debate on a definition of
strategy. The term 'strategy' has been defined in
many ways and has a variety of meanings depending on
the context in which it is used. In Game Theory
strategy is defined as: (Basar and Olsder, 1982,
P.G) .
%
"a decision rule which may depend on some as 
r yet unknown event but which describes the 
action which„must be taken once the outcome of 
the event is known".
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______' 1 I.-' ~______. /' ' ~ . V. :
/  r h: ' . " ' :
The4term strategy was taken^frpm<the military field
where it has been in usfe for thousands ofe,years.;
(Many aujbhors in the strategy /field use ^mili^ary
terms' when describing strategy. See for example
Kotler ^ nd Sihgh# 1981; Clifford and Cavanagh, lr985 ;
MacMillan, 1985)r in the military sense strategy is
defined as fOllowh: (Liddell Hart, 1967)
a. Clausewitz : "the art of the employment of
- j- battles as a means to gaining
! the objectives of war"
b. Mbltke : "the practical application of
the means placed at a general's 
disposal to the attainment of
n  ^ ? the objectives in view"
c. Liddell Hart: "the art of distributing and!
^ , applying military means to
fulfil the ends of policy".
_ '  ■■ t ■ ■' ■
In management theory a number of definitions exist. 
For Our purposes it is constructive to divide them 
into two categories : firstly, those that, deal with 
management intention, and secondly, those that deal 
with the behaviour actually exhibited by the firm. 
Examples of the first category are:
"the determination of the basic long-term 
goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the 
adoption of courses of action and allocation 
of resources necessary for carrying out these 
goals". r
(Chandler, 1962, p.13)
"The policies and key decisions adopted by
CHAPTER
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. - . a  - -  '  - " :  ^ : I
management that have major impacts on financial 
performance. ; These policies and decisions are 
usually significant resource commitments and 
are not easily reversible".
5 (Buzzell and Gale, 1987, p.18)
As pointed out by^Mintzberg „(1978> p. 935) these 
definitions treat strategy as (a) explicit ■ ■('by­
developed consciously and purposefully, and (c) made 
in advance of the specific decisions to which they 
apply. These macro plans still need to be 
translated into a seri-esTdf small decisions and 
implemented before actual exhibited strategy changes 
(an interesting study was done on policy making and 
implementation by Allison (1971) showing that not 
all decisions which are made, even at the highest 
lev-1, are implemented). «
The second category of strategy definitions relate 
more closely to the actual exhibited behaviour of 
it he | firm. For example (Mintzberg, 1978, p.935) 
-refPrsir tok the| above def initions as "intended 
Strategy"' ahd clefihes "realised strategy" as "a 
tern in a stream of decisions".
U  ivi, 1  :■
xrick (19i33b> p.5) builds on this definition (and 
sines something i of i the ' other definitions) in 
;fining strategy as: :  i! i v
"a pattern in a stream of decisions (past or 
i intended) that (a) guides the organisations
\ ongoing alignment with its environment and (b)
| shapes internal policies and procedures"
The role of strategy is widely accepted as mediating 
on an organisation1 s interactions with its
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environment (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, .1969; Child, 
1972; Miles and Snow, 1978)and to be of practical 
use to managers strategy's role relates to,future 
courses of action and to change (Goold & Quinn 
1990). Therefore, the definitions in the first 
category are. more useful to practising managers. 
However, the researchers problem is diametrically 
opposed to this and is more acute. It is difficult 
enough to measure realised strategy but would be 
almost impossible to measure intended strategy (as 
well) On the scale required for statistical 
analysis. Researchers (eg. Hambrick, 1983a, 1983b; 
Miller, 1988; fellis' and Fornell, 1988; Woo, 1983, 
1984; Woo & Cooper, 1981, 1982) usually go one step 
further^ and evaluate a business's strategy by 
"eva^'-'/^^ng i a - set of "strategy variables". (For 
ex ira ;. Salbraith & Schendel (1983) initially used: 
2f * .bategy variable" and then applied principal 
component analysis and cluster analysis to PIMS data 
to come up with strategic typologies.) Clearly this 
approach is more in line with the second category of 
definitions as it is an attempt to measure 
"realised" strategy.
2.1.4 The Importance of Market Share
As mentioned in section 2.1.2 market share is one of 
the basic elements in both of the two main paradigms 
used in business studies. As such, it is clearly of 
fundamental importance to researchers in these 
areas. ' However there are other even more compelling 
reasons why the relationship between market share 
and profitability should be the subject of dedicated 
research and debate.
Firstly, the now ageing but still widely used BCG
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product portfolio matrix rests on the assumption 
that market share and profitability are linked in a 
particular manner. This assumed relationship was 
articulated and investigated by Hambrick and 
MacMillan (1982) and the BCG assumption and the 
corresponding PIMS data are shown in figure 2.3.
Figure 1. BCG Matrix
Real
Market
Growth
Rate
High Stars Wildcats
Cash
Low Cows Dogs
High Low
/
Relative Market Share
Figure 2. Relative Market 
Share vs. ROI Presumed 
by BCG Matrix
Figure 3. Relative Market 
Share vs. ROI for PIMS 
ihdustrial-Product Businesses
ROI
ROI
.5 1.0 1.5
Relative Market Share
2.0.5 1.0 1.5
Relative Market Share
2.0
Fig 2.3 BCG Assumed and Actual Market Share
Relationships
0 (Source : Hambrick & MacMillan, 1982, p.87)
As can be seen by a cursory study of the two graphs 
in figure 2.3, the presumed relationship did -not
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hold exactly for the PIMS data. The overall trend 
in the relationship was the same but. the differences 
led Hambrick and MacMillan to challenge and redef ine 
the role of the 'dog' in the product portfolio. 
Although the BCG matrix has been criticised for 
being over simplistic (Hamermesh, Anderson & Harris, 
1978, p.96) it is still widely used. There are also 
numerous other,strategic planning grids which are
more complex and yet still have a heavy emphasis on
% - . t -. ' '
market share included in their \ 'market
r attractiveness' dimension. (See for example Abell 
and Hammond (1979, pp.173-259) for a discussion of 
some strategic planning grids including the 'Market 
Attractiveness and Business Position' model). All 
these are used as strategic planning tools and all 
rely to some , extent on some (unproven and not
necessarily understood) relationship between market 
share and profitability. Given the wide acceptance 
and extensive use of these concepts, (see for example 
Bettis and Hall, 1983; Hall, 1978; Gupta, 1984) , any 
' research providing insights into this area would be
useful and important. - v \
The second reason for studying the relation between 
market share and profitability and one which is 
primarily in the domain Of Industrial Organisation 
Theory, is its effect on anti-trust policy. Here 
the question of causality is clearly paramount. If 
market share causes higher profitability by reducing 
costs due to (for example) economies of scale, then 
 ^it may be in a particular country's best interest to 
allow mergers leading to higher market share 
companies. . However, \if on the other hand high
market -7 share causes higher profitability by
collusive behaviour and thus forcing prices to rise 
to levels higher than would otherwise be the case.
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then it would clearly not be in a country' S\ best 
interests to allow mergers which would result in 
higher market share companies. (This involves the 
question of concentration versus market share which 
is further discussed by Gale & Branch, 1982) . 
Although these questions have always been important, 
they are becoming a more important as trade barriers 
shrink, information flows more quickly and more and 
mote authors talk of global economies, global 
integration and global market Shares (eg. Ohmae 
1982, 1987, 1988; Porter, 1990; Buzzell, Quelch & 
Bartlett, 1992). ^
Thirdly, market share is used , in strategy 
formulation as a contingent variable which dictates 
a particular stratigic approach - eg ' strategies for 
high market share companies7 or 'the impact of 
market share on corporate turnaround strategies' 
(See for example Gayvel, .1982; Bloom and Kotler, 
1975; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Best and Kahle, 
1985; Maher, 1984;) Clearly, this makes market 
share an important variable in its own right.
./
2.2 STUDIES SUPPORTING A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MARKET SHARE AND PROFITABILITY
In section 2.1 mention was made of the early work by 
T)ain in 1951 which was followed up by Shepherd 
(1972) and Gale (1972). All of these studies used 
data which did not distinguish between individual 
businesses within a firm. For example Shepherd 
(1972, p.27) used data from the Fortune Directory. 
To try to get single business data, he eliminated 
firms with a "high degree of internal
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' diversification">u However since ° his, sample 
primarily cdvered the largest 500 firms in the USA, 
it is difficult to believe that „ internal 
diversification was not present to a large degree in 
the data. Despite these limitations Shepherd (1972> 
p.30) states that "throughout [the analysis] the 
market share association is positive and highly 
significant; its linearity is probable but not 
"-h / definite". /  ^ 1 ’ n
With the advent of PIMS, (see appendix I for 
historical overview and Buzz ell ^ and Gale, 198%;
, Anderson and Paine, 1978; Kehoe, 1983; for more
background information), for the first time business 
unit level data was available with a wealth of 
strategic information all collected on the same 
basis I This data was used by Buzzell, Gale and 
0 Sultan, (1975) (following up from work done by
Schoeffler, Buzzell & Heany, 1974) to produce "what 
turned out to be a classic paper on the subject of _ 
market share and profitability and one which was 
still being debated a decade later. The paper 
starts off by presenting the PIMS zesults of the 
correlation between market share and profitability 
(see figure 2.4).
Buzzell et al (1975, p.98) go on to state that there 
are "at least three possible explanations [for the 
correlation]: , -
Economies of scale; The most obvious rationale 
for the high rate of return enjoyed by large- 
share businesses is that they have achieved 
economies of scale in procurement, 
X. manufacturing, marketing, : and other cost 
components. A business with 40% shnre of a
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given market is simply twice as big as one 
with 20% of the same market, and it will 
attain, to a much greater degree, more 
. • efficient methods of operation within a
particular type of technology.
Exhibit I
Relationship between market share and pretax ROI
. . '1
r[' - ' '■■■
8 -
20 iV'
'
10 /) . <r
0 ‘
Under 10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% Over 40%
Market Share
Pig 2.4 - The Relationship between Market Share and ROI
(Source : Buzzell et al, 1975, p.98}
Closely related to this explanation is the so- 
 ^?fV ' called "experience curve" phenomenon widely
, publicised by the Boston Consulting Group.O' ' V; „ r '
According to BCG, total unit costs of 
producing and distributing a product tend to 
decline by a more or less constant percentage 
with each doubling of a company's cumulative 
output• Since, 4 n n a given time period, 
businesses with large market shares generally 
also have larger cumulative sales than their
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW PAGE 33
' smaller competitors, they would_iD^^expected to
have lower costs and corresponding higher 
; profits. \
r "> Market Power; Many economists, especially 
among those involved in antitrust work, 
believe that economies of scale are of 
relatively little importance in most , 
7 - industries. These economists argue that if
large-scale businesses earn higher profits 
than their smaller competitors, it is a result 
■ V  of their greater market power: their size
permits them to bargain more effectivelyi 
"administer" prices, and, in the end, realise 
, significantly higher prices for a particular 
product. N  ;
• „ Quality of Management: The simplest of all
e x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  m a r k e t -
c share/profitability relationship is that both 
I ■ - „
share arid ROI reflect a common underlying
. - factor: „ the quality of management. Good
managers (including, perhaps, lucky ones!) are
successful in achieving high shares of their
o respective markets; they are also skilful in
controlling costs, getting maximum
productivity from employees, and so on.
_ Moreover, once a business achieves a„ 
leadership position - possibly by developing a 
" new field - it is much easier for it to retain
its lead than for others to catch up".
These explanations have been quoted in full because 
they are extremely interesting and will be examined 
in more detail later in this section. Before this 
is done, for the sake of continuity, an overview of
' '1i ' -J." - i .lii i     " I,
the rest of the paper will be given.
Buzzell et al then go oh to explain how market share 
relates? to ROI and riikke 4 points in this regard: |
a) Sales to investment remains constant but 
profit/sales increases as market share
—  - increases. -t
b) Purchases to Sales ratio decrease as market 
_ share increases. ;
c) Marketing costs decrease as market share 
increases.
d) Price (and quality) increase as market shares 
increases.
The authors do not specifically state that there is 
a causal process at work but later in the paper 
discuss building, holding and harvesting strategies 
and imply.in their building strategy.that increased 
market share will result in increased profitability 
(i.e. causality) . Also included in the paper is the 
assertion that the relationship is dependent on 
structural factors and that market share is more 
 ^ important (i.e. the correlation between market share 
and profitability is stronger)  ^when buyers are 
fragmented and When purchases ahe infrequent (i.e. 
hinting at a contingency approach).
The paper made a huge impact on management and 
consultant thinking and, in some cases, was
' _ ' i)
simplistically interpreted as putting forward a 
'universal law' that higher - market share caused 
higher profitability. This was widely criticised on
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the basis that ho universal laws can exist in the
' - ' " Y ' ' ' - ' '
strategy arena because no two situations are exactly 
alike. Also many examples exist of low share firms 
which are highly n profitable. (These are reviewed
later in this chapter.)
j _ - " . _ - ' ' '
The correlation between market share and 
profitability had been established by many authors 
but Buzzell et al raised two major issues:
1. whether there is a causal relationship between 
market share and profitability, and o
2. whether the relationship is universally
applicable. "
/' - .
These two issues are obviously critical to strategy 
formulation and to- examine them in more detail we 
. return now to the eki lunation given by Buzzell et al 
for the relationship between market share ^nd 
profitability. h
The first reason given iq. that of economies of 
scale, and this is linked to the experience curve 
phenomenon. The experience curve was derived from 
the learning-curve theory that arose from 
observations concerning the number of man-hours 
>\ ! required for the production of aeroplanes at an Air
Y Force base in Ohio in 1925 (Gluck, 1985, p.6). The
observation was made that the production man-hours 
declined as the cumulative production volume 
increased. This-concept was>broadened by the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) into the experience curve- 
concept. Experience curves, according to Hall and 
Howell (1985, p. 197) "refer to the fall in costs 
which allegedly occur over the total life Of a 
product ... and the cost affected are total costs".
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The BCG applied this concept in the mid 60s and 70s 
to a number of situations including automobiles, 
refrigerators, Japanese beer and French vacuum 
cleaners (Kiechel, 1981, p .13 9), The view put
forward by BCG in the mid 1370s was that the 
experience curve applied to all businesses and all 
functions and that a doubling of tlie number of units 
produced would result"in a fall in costs typically 
of around 25% to 30%. ^
If one accepts the logic of the experience curve as
put forward by the BCG in the mid 70s then the
causal link between market share and profitability
is clearly made. Also, it could be expected that
this would be%rd uhiyersal phenomenon since The
experience curve was thought to be universally
applicable. However, subsequent research has made
these assertions questionable. Firstly, Hall and 
 ^- ' ' " . - ' . . .  
Howell (1985, p .205) point out that although costs
are observed to fail over time the reasons include
factors like technological progress, reduction in
input prices, and Changes in internal efficiency.
which may have nothing tg do with either scale,or
accumulated output. v, s
This view is borne out by Hall (1980) who provides 
several examples of companies in mature industries 
; that have enjoyed high profitability despite having 
low market share. Hall (1980, p.81) states that 
"high market share and accumulated experience are 
not essential for cost leadership in a mature
r' ' 'f ' n !i -
market". Also, other authors have suggested that 
the experience curve is only applicable to certain 
industries or industries with certain 
characteristics. For example, Jacobson and Aaker 
(1985, p.11) state that experience curve effects are
'!
■ ! ■ .  ^ '""A, ■ "1 n
, '" " : ' ^ ' \ \ : ' - -/.'Mr"':)- ' " /
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, - ' (' - " j. . r,-p ^
found in industries with high levels of value added^ »
continuous process manufacturing and high capital 
intensity, but not other contexts, most notably » ,
service and extraction industries. Other authors' i
. (^. Ohemawat and Spence, 1985; Li#bierman, 1989)
have observed that due to spill-over effects, ;
learning is an industry wide phenomenon and that ;
individual firms have similar costs and therefore no 
competitive advantage. Despite the above 
qualifications the experience curve still has some |
applicability (see Ghemawat, 1985) and is wiolely
Used and built into economic models (eg. Dolan and
Jeuland, 1981). However, in terms of a reason for 
the relationship between market l( share and r? 
profitability it is clearly now not thought to be as 
powerful as it was in the mid 70s.
The second reason given by Buzzell et al is that of 
marketr power. ' Although the authors use somewhat 
guarded language they seem to be referring to so- ~
called oligopolistic co-ordinatioja or collusion.
This is very much in line with Industrial n
Organisation theory which asserts that concentrated
^  ^ " - - ./ ! 
market _ structures facilitate „ oligopolistic co- f< 1
j
ordination and l^ad to monopoly -level prices. If 
this is correct, a weighted average of' the r
profitabilities of all firms that comprise a \
concentrated market should exceed the competitive 
norm. The subject was researched extensively by 
Gale & Branch (1982, p.84) who point out that under 
this assertion the burden of maintaining prices by 
absorbing excess capacity usually falls heavily on 
the high share participants. " Therefore profits 
should vary primarily with ^ concentration and little 
or not at all with market share. Gale & Branch go 
on to argue that the opposing view ^ asserts that
\) -
0CHAPTER 2 r  LITERATURE REVIEW PAGE 38
 ---- :   ■ - ■■■=_______ — ______________ ■ ■■ ■   '--------        — ____ i.—
there are economies of scale which apply to a number 
of different facets of the Organisation which should 
result in a positive relationship between market ; 
share aad^profitability. The authors then run a 
multiple linear regression with concentration, 
market share (and an interaction term) regressed 
againstxxROI using PIMS data. Their finding showed 
that market share contains far more explanatory 
power than1cdncentration.; Clearly this makes, the 
second explanation of Buzzell et al somewhat 
unlikely.
The third reason given by Buzzell et al for the 
positive relationship between market share f and 
"profitability is quality of management. This is 
extremely interesting as this constitutes a spurious 
factor and implies that there is no causal link 
between market share and profitability. It appears 
as though the authors discounted this view to seme 
extent because later in the paper (under building , 
strategies) they imply a causal link. Perhaps of 
equal importance ; is the possibility that the 
relationship between market Share and profitability 
is due to luck. Based on pure chance, a business 
may stumble ontd a product strategy that proves to 
be successful. RumsIt and Wensley (1981) (and 
Lippman and Rumslt, 1982) took this View and showed 
that there is strong evidence of a/stochastic effect 
(luck) and virtually no evidence of a direct effect. 
Thus they contend that the relationship could be due 
entirely to random processes.
From the foregoing argument it is obvious that the 
case for the proposition that higher market share 
causes higher profitability, is far from clear cut. 
The paper by Buzzell et al has been widely debated
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(clritieised arid defended) by many authdrs and.^till 
some of the fundamental propositions remain 
\ unresolved. .'-V
In an attempt to resolve some of these basic 
concepts researchers turned their.attehtion to the 
so-called mid-range theories. In section 2.1 it was 
r-'J pointed out- that two views on business-levelc 
X;-.' /> strategy have dominated the "literature. Firstly 
V  there is the situational view ^hicri holds that nd 
V two situations are alike and therefore strategy is 
’ an alignment of environmental threats and
- opportunities with internal strengths and weaknesses 
X" (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1969; Yavitz rind Newman,
1982) . Proponents of this view conduct in-depth case 
studies and industry studies. The second, and 
opposing view, is that Universal laws Of strategy 
exist and hold for all settings (eg. Buz riel1 et al, 
1975). However, between these opposing views are 
- mid-range theories, -(eg Pitts, 1980; Pascarella,
- 1984; Hambrick, 1983; Miller, 1981; Miller and 
’ FrieS^n, 1977) According to Hambrick (1983c,
- j p.213} : . _
| -' "it should be possible) to identify commonly
j recurring "settings" and to observe how
, - ^different strategies tend to fare in each.
c ’ . .  1  ^ ;
setting" r ' I
Hambrick, MacMillan and Day (1982, p.511) quote 
Bourgeois (1980, p.229) as stating:
" * . . .  ' '
"The solution is for the researcher to
abstract a smaller number of more encompassing
conceptual categories with a broader range of
generalisability". ^
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r, This approach is known as a contingency approach or 
a situational approach. Ramanujam and Venkatraman 
(1984, p.139) differentiate between contingency and 
situational approaches as follows: v j
^ " Cdnt: ingeriby factors derived, mainly from
: organisational- theory have been jested as
moderating influences in the relationships
y [affecting business unit profitability).
Examples of such contingent factors include 
environmental uncertainty, Organisational goal 
structure, organisational technology, and 
product life cycle (PLC) stage 
• situational lectors [on the other hand] 
include entry . and exit barriers, low 
performance and turnaround, and low versus 
high market share effectiveness". (\
Many authors (eg. Hambrick, MacMillan and Day, 1932) 
combine the two categories and refer to them merely 
as contingency theories. Since the early 1980s this 
approach has been growing in popularity (eg. 
Galbraith and Schendel, 1983; Hambrick, 1983a;
1983b; 1983c; Woo and Cooper, 1981; 1:982) and has 
grown to become "one of the methodological mainstays 
of work in strategic management" (Miller, 1988,
- p.239). ' - ' " ,, " -
Phillips, Chang and Buzzell (1983) used this 
approach in conjunction with path analysis to 
explore some key causal paths iri the PIMS data base. 
The "settings" that were used were simply the 6 
business types (eg. consumer durables, consumed non- 
durables, capital goods, etch that^ , exist within 
PIMS. Their findings with regard to market share 
were interesting in that market share was shbwn to
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have a significant positive causal effect on ROI in 
all businesses, but the mechanism by which this 
occurs varied according to the type of business.
"In the case of consumer non-durables and
f-y materials businesses, relative market position 
influences ROI only by its effects on cost
' position... In the case of consumer durables
V and components business an opposite conclusion
V  emerges. Market position influences ROI only
via mechanisms other than costs... Finally, in 
the case of the capital goods and supplies 
businesses, relative market position
influences ROI indirectly by its beneficial 
effects on relative direct cost position and 
directly via mechanisms other than costs".
- - (Phillips et al, 1983, p.37)
Thus Phillips efc al found that there was, in all 
businesses, a causal link between market share and 
profitability but that the mechanism was different 
for the different businesses. This to some extent 
explains why no satisfactory, "universal"
" ' • j i
explanation could be found for the correlation of 
market share and profitability found by Buzzell 
efc al (1975) . In an earlier study of 10 industries, 
Bass, Cattin and Wittink (1978, p.8) found similarly 
that increases in market share increased 
profitability although t-he extent of the increase 
varied across the industries.
In summary, it would appear that the correlation of 
market share with profitability is beyond dispute. 
Further, there appears to be strong evidence that a 
causal link between market share and profitability 
exists. However, despite much debate and many
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theories, the mechanism by which market share 
h, influences profitability is not well ^understood or 
? ’ accepted. , i , -
2.3 STUDIES NOT SUPPORTING A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MARKET SHARE AND PROFITABILITY
v. The research presented in section 2.2 focused oh 
papers 'supporting the view that higher market share 
causes higher prof itability, In this section we
focus on the opposing view.
Fruhan = in his paper entitled "Pyrrhic.
Victories in Fights for Market Share" gave 3 
examples from different industries which questioned 
the wisdom of aggressive market share i\ increasing 
strategies. Although Fruhan's paper confirmed the 
correlation between market - share and profitability 
in the industries concerned, he also pointed out the 
pitfalls ahd problems; related^Jtb getting -higher 
market share. » In the early 70s the prevailing view 
from consultants and researchers was that low share 
business should either be grown into higher shares 
or divested. Specifically, according to BCG, low 
share businesses in low growth industries (dogs on 
the BCG product-portfolio matrix) "may show 
accounting profit, but theP profit must be re­
invested to maintain share, leaving no cash throw 
off. The product is essentially worthless, except 
in liquidation" (Hambrick & MacMillan, 1982, p.84)". 
As pointed out by Woo and Copper (1981, p.301) this 
advice is hardly helpful to a business manager of a 
low market share business!
The question of strategies for low market share 
businesses was fijst addressed in a meaningful way
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by Hamermesh, Anderson and Harris in 1978 in a paper 
entitled "Strategies fgr low market share 
businesses". The authors challenged the prevailing
view that low share business had two strategic
- - , , „ , , ■ - - - .
options; to fight to increase market share or 
withdraw from the industry. Hamermesh efc al 
examined 900 businesses from 30 major industries in 
JT’orbSis Annual Report bn American Industry" and 
found numerous successful low share businesses. 
f (They defined low share as being less than half the 
industry leaders share and successful as a company 
whose five year average return on equity" surpassed, 
the industry median.) From the successful low share 
' companies Hamermesh et al selected three companies 
for closer analysis whose earnings were 
substantially higher than the industry median and in 
some cases were the highest performers in the 
industry. Despite the fact that the three companies 
selected were from substantially different 
industri^es/^four common strategic characteristics 
were found: (Hamermesh et al 1978, p.98).
. they carefully segment their markets,
2. . they use research and development funds
efficiently,
3. they think small, and
4. their chief executive's influence is 
pervasive.
The authors acknowledge that low share businesses do 
have some serious obstacles that must be overcome if 
the business is to be successful. These include 
small research budgets, few economies of scale in 
manufacturing, little opportunity to distribute 
products directly, little public and customer 
recognition, and difficulties in attracting capital
- - r ; / / - ' - - " : : ' :
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and ambitious employees. However, despite these 
obstacles"Hamermesh et al (1978, p.102) comment as 
' follows: ; c.’"- . " . " - , f
"... we have found that a small market share 
is not necessarily a handicap; it can be av, 
significant advantage that enables a company 
to compete in ways that are unavailable to its 
- larger rivals." ' „ '' "
- : - . » ; ' - V  J
This proposition was picked up by Woo and Cooper
(1981) and investigated in ,a more systematic and
statistically rigorpus way. One of the major
problems of the research done by Hamermesh et al is
that despite the quality and depth of the analysis, 
... - ' - '  ^^ )
the results are based on a sample of three. Clearly
the chances of this being generalisable across all
business with a low market share are statistically
very small. Woo and Cooper approached the problem
in a more generalisable way using the PIMS data
base. Their research sought to identify strategies
which had proven effective for low share businesses
and were represented by two; Categories of decisions:
\ \  ' " - 
(Woo and Cooper, 1981, p.302)
1 Q
(1) product-market ^ phoices at the corporate level
relating to participation in particular
businesses (the corporate strategy decision)
' (2) competitive strategy at the business level
indicating how a business competes and
allocates its resources, > given the product- 
market choice in (l) (the business strategy 
decision)*
The methodology used was to define 13 variables
: k  /
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which described the prCduct-market-industry
characteristics and 13 Variables which describe the % 
competitive strategy exhibited, (see figure 2.5) r
Sf.; Produet-msrkct-industfy characteristics' Competitive strategy
1. Type or product
2. Standardization o f products
3. Importance of auxiliary services
4. Product life cycle stage
5. Purchase frequency (end user)
6. Purchase frequency (immediate user)
7. Geographic location
8. Industry value-added
9. Industry concentration
10. Number o f competitors
11. Real market growth
12. Industry growth
13. Frequency of product changes
1. Relative price ^
2. Relative quality
3. Relative product breadth
4. Relative emphasis on new products
5. Proprietary products
6. Proprietary processes
7. R & D  intensity (product)
8. R & D  intensity (process)
9. Relative advertising
10. Relative sales.force.
11. Relative vertical integration (backwards)
12. Relative vertical integration (forwards)"
13. Relative direct costs
Fig 2.5 - Variables representing product-market 
choice and competitive strategy V
(Source : Woo and Cooper, 1981, p.303)
To highlight the findings pertaining) to low share 
businesses the authors contrasted effective low 
share businesses with (1) effective high share 
businesses and (2) ineffective low share businesses. 
(Low share was defined as less than 20% of the 
combined share of the three largest competitors. 
Effective was defined as an ROI of greater than 20% 
and ineffective as an ROI of less than 5%.)
Woo and Cooper tested 3 main hypotheses and their 
findings are as follows:
Firstly, they tested whether the product-market 
choices of effective low share businesses were 
different to ineffective low share businesses and 
different to effective high share businesses.
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, j di/erall, n their results^ showed that ^effective low 
share businesses were found to pursue product-market 
choices 0 different, from effective high share 
businesses, However, the environments of effective 
and ineffective Ibw share businesses were not found 
to be significantly different. - o
Secondly, the authors tested whether within the same 
environment (defined by similar products, markets
i) ; : : ' . .
and industry characteristics), competitive 
strategies of effective low share businesses 
differed from those of effective high share 
businesses (within the same environment) and 
differed from ineffective low share businesses. 
Their findings showed a strong difference between 
the competitive strategies of effective low share 
businesses, and effective high share businesses. 
(Some of the differences in strategy were that 
compared to high share businesses, low share 
businesses did less advertising and personal 
selling, spent,relatively more on product R & D to 
maintain high quality standards and spent relatively 
less on process R & D.) The authors also found that 
the competitive strategies of effective low share 
businesses differed significantly from the 
strategies of ineffective low share businesses.
Thirdly, the authors tested whether groups of 
effective low share businesses operating under 
dissimilar product-market conditions pursue 
different competitive strategies. Although some 
differences Were found, the authors did not believe 
that the differences were significant and therefore 
could not support their original hypothesis.
- " ' " ' \ 
a Woo and Cooper's work is interesting for two
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reasons. Firstly, the methodology used (that of 
, employing cluster analysis! to define ^enyironmeiihs" 
and strategy: typologies) was very important as it 
added immeasurably to the debate concerning market 
share and profitability and has been used by many 
other authois since then leg. H^mbrick, MacMillan 
and Day, 1982; Hambrick 1983a; 1983b; 1983c :
Galbraith & Schendel, 1983>1 Dess and^Davis, 1984) . 
Although cluster analysis had been used^ extensively 
- in many other disciplines this was the first time it 
had been applied to market share and profitability. 
Secondly, the results obtained by Woo and Cooper are 
extremely important in that they show that small 
market share businesses can enjoy high profitability 
and that this is largely influenced by the strategy 
employed (business and corporate). These findings 
nlire interesting and clash directly with the 
> JL? conventional thinking of growing or divesting small 
v. market share businesses.
' W  ; / .." ' - "/ ' %  '
rl Woo and Cooper's (1981) work was followed up by Woo 
(1983) when she examined the strategies of 41 
businesses which were markets leaders but displayed 
poor performance. The focus of the research was to 
identify the factors which differentiated the low 
return performers from the high return performers. 
Four categories of explanatory factors were 
examined: -n
(1) market stability
(2) demand characteristics r
(3) organisation commitments
(4) competitive strategy
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Figure 2.6 shows the variables from the PIMS data 
base that were included in each category.
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Fig 2.6 - Explanatory factors of high share 
profitability
(Source : Woo, 1983, p.126) !
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: Again, Woo's methodology was based on contrasting'^ 
low return businesses against high return businesses 
o to highlight differences using cluster analysis.
Woo, found that the low return businesses operated 
more often in unstable markets and in markets where 
auxiliary Services were - important. Regarding 
organisational commitments, although none of the 
variables were statistically signif icant, low return 
businesses were associated with a greater degree of 
internal commitments. Competitive strategies for 
the two groupss were significantly different, with 
high return businesses having distinctly loweif costs o 
"than low return businesses.
While not disproving the correlation between market 
share and profitability, Woo's work does highlight 
caveats to the relationship. It appears that the 
: relationship between market share and profitability 
is context specific, and in certain environments may , 
not exist at all. Also it appears that the 
relationship is not "automatic" but is dependent on 
the competitive strategies adopted by the business.
Woo (1983) clearly showed that not all high market ., 
share companies have ^ high returns, and Woo and 
Cooper (1981) earlier showed that not all low market 
share companies: have low return. r  ^ _ .
 ^The work done by Hambrick, MacMillan and Day (1982) , 
which examined the assumptions underlying the BCG 
product-portfolio matrix using the Pl'MS data base, 
supports this view. In general the findings 
supported the primary thesis of BCG i.e. businesses 
in the four quadrants of the matrix have, quite 
different tendencies to generate or consume cash. / 
The primary point of disagreement between Hambrick 
et al and BCG has to do with the performance of
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Table
Dogs. Hambrick et al (1982, m  94) summarise as 
follows: . ' ■- A
Dogs perform better khan BCG has led us
to believe, 
very well.
InCfact, some Dogs perform
.<1  ’ -
-- ' /  % --
Certain stratetpjG factors are associated 
with high profitability amongst Dogs» 
The notable factors are low capital 
intensity, attention to efficiency, a 
narrow focus, high product quality and 
low to moderate prices. p
Top management of a company can affect 
whesther ,Dogs , achieve their potential as 
long-term, reliable cash generators.”
The strategies proposed by Hambrick et al is 
Similar although not identical to the other 
authors. The various recommended strategies
for low .share businesses are summarised in
- - %
Table 2.2.
2.2 - Summary of strategies for low market share businesses
Hamormesh et al (1978): • segmentation ' /
R&D effective
• think small
• CEO influence important
Woo & Cooper (1981): Product market choice important 
less advertising 
less personal selling 
relatively more product R&D 
• high quality
Hambrick et al (1982): low capital intensity •’ 
efficiency , 
narrow focus 
high quality 
low prices .
CEO influence important |
These studies not only offer examples of low marlcet
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- share businesses which are effective, but also give 
recommendations for strategy. The fact that each 
study arrived at different conclusions could either 
result from metholodogical limitations , of the 
studies, or could point to the contextual nature of 
these strategic recommendations. While these 
studies_do not constitute a comprehensive' blueprint 
for strategy formulation for low share businesses 
they clearly^3 cast some doubt on the causal 
relationship between market share and profitability. 
Supporting this view is a completely separate school v 
, of thought which holds that the relationship between 
„ market share and profitability is primarily due to
luck or random events (as mentioned in section 2.2) . 
Mancke (1974) first put forward this view when he 
proposed that the relationship between market share 
end profitability,was due to the random outcome on 
each;firm's capital budget. These random outcomes 
dictated the "success" of the firm in terms of 
growth and profitability. High growth ended up in 
high market share and high profitability hence 
explaining the correlation. ^
This theory is acknowledged by many authors (eg. 
Jacobson and Aaker, 1985; Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) and was tested using 
thS PIMS data base by Rumelt & Wensley (1981) . 
Their model was constructed to discriminate between 
so called 'direct' and 'stochaetic' effects. To do 
this two equations were constructed : the first 
, stating that return at the end of a 5 year period x- 
depends on the beginning rate of return and a number 
 ^ of factors affecting the change in return. These 
include the growth of marketing expenditure, the 
rate of change of prices, the growth rate of market 
share, the change in capacity utilization and
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finally the unobserved stochastic shock (X). The 
second equation states that the growth in output 
d&pehds on the prior level of grb\%Jx;Jf^:,t|e 
previous period), the overall industry growth/ the 
initial market share, the initial rate bt return,
A
the economy-wide rajte. of growth, the ;growth
of marketing expenditure aud pric^a apd: the 
;unant icipat ed stochastic shock (X). Thus the
equations are (Rumelt & Wensley, 1981, p.4) :
Rs a0 + a^ Rj + a2GM + a3GP + atGS 
+ a5DRYR + a6DCU + a7X + er
GQ — b0 + bjGI + b2GM + b3GP z4- b<R1 
+ b5Sl + b6GQ0 + b7GQYR + X + eq 
where ,
(2)
ki, R2, R5 : Return on investment in years 1, 2 and 
5 respectively.
DRYR , : Average change in return for all
1 " PIMS businesses over the period.
D€U
GP
GM
GQ
GO,
GQYR
Four year trend (regression fit) 
in capacity utilisation,.
Four year growth! rate in the
price index.   -
Four year growth rate in 
marketing expenditure.
Four^ year growth rate in 
marketing expenditure.
Prior growth rate measured as the 
growth rate of Q between years 1 
and 2. &
Average GQ experienced by all 
PIMS businesses during the 
period.
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Si Market share in year 1. Share is
", v taken as the .ratio ^p£ ° " thi
y  business unit output (Q) to ,%e
unit output of the market. c 
GS r, : . Four year growth rate in market
" ' /- " /-Aare. - \
v-> GI : Long term (last 10 years) growth
rate in output of the relevant 
industry (not market) .
The two equations could be estimated independently 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) but this would 
not | take into account the common^ unobservable X 
which appears as a correlation between the residuals
of (1) and (2) . According to Rumelt ahd Wens ley the
appropriate technique is SUR (seemingly unrelated^ 
regression) which consists of a generalized least; 
squares approach applied to several equations. The 
authors applied this technique to 976 businesses in 
the P1MS data base where 5 consecutive years of data 
were available. The authors found strong stochastic 
effects and concluded that "the intrinsic value of
• j ' \ .  -  o  ,  ' ' '
market share has been grossly overstated.
The conclusion reached by Rumelt and Wensley is 
important and interesting but unfortunately, in the 
view of this researcher, the credibility of the work 
is marred by the lack of justification or logic for 
the inclusion of variables chosen in their model. 
The authors give no reasons or justification for 
their equations and no explanation for why certain 
variables were chosen while others omitted. . Other 
authors have criticised the conclusions reached by 
Rumelt and Wensley. Jacobson and Aaker (1985, p.20) 
point out that Rumelt and Wensley's work lacks power 
and that "the conclusion might not stem from a lack 
of relationship but perhaps from an inability of the
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approach to detect „an relationship", i.e. the test 
could have a large Type II error in the detection of
"'f- ' n.'_ ; _ n " ' -
small market share" effects."
Jacobson and Aaker (1985) use lagged ROI as a 
surrogate for firm specific factors occurring in 
previous periods that tend to be constant on a year- 
, „ on-year basis and influence ROI and also (perhaps) 
market share. Jacobson and Aaker use a 3 phase 
approach starting with a simple ROI/market share 
regression, moving through the inclusion of lagged 
ROI to end up with a more complex model which 
includes other variables to reduce the impact of 
omitted factors. Their model was applied to the 
» data in the PIMS data base and their findings showed
that the direct effect of market share on 
profitability was much smaller, than previously 
estimated. While Buzzell et al (1975) had found 
that a 1% change in market share Caused a 0,5% 
change in ROI, Jacobson and Aaker (1985, p.20) 
estimate that (fa 1% change in market share would be 
associated with a 0,1% change in ROI.
In examining the construction of the models used by 
various researchers doing cross-sectional or 
longitudinal analysis of the PIMS data base one is 
struck by the divergence, and lack of agreement or 
standardisation that exists concerning methodology, 
analysis procedure and (most of all) the explanatory 
variables. Table 2 .3 shows a comparison of the 
explanatory variables used by a range of authors to 
construct equations to model essentially the same 
phenomenon.
Although there is some commonality, the vast range 
, of variables included and omitted in the various
, . . v  : : - ■ ; '  . -■ •
.'3,° _ . -- - p  n-' ' -
CHAPTER 2  ^ LITERATURE REVIEW PAGE 55
"'.v,-,.,—  ---- ? - i -c
models! and the vastly ^differing conclusions reached
by the^/fespective authorscontributes more to 
- " - "
confuSioti-ijthan to knowledge. It is very difficult
to the merits of one analysis relative to any
Ofher.because of differences in methodology and in 
explanatory variables. If one makes the assumption 
that these models are all correctly constructed and 
analyses and that the results are valid (considering 
the limitations of the model),, then the only 
reasonable conclusion that can be arrived at is that 
’the relationship between market share and
profitability is highly Sensitive to a wide range7of 
"explanatory” factors. I This conclusion in a sense 
supports the view that the effect of market share is 
context specific and that the factors describing the 
contextual settings are numerous and complex.
A)
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7 a
Market share (and/or lagged MS) ” / 1 y ,;: X X X X X X
» ' r. n"
ROI (lagged) ^ X
Vertical,Integration X o X X
Marketing expenditure . X X X X
- -
Capital utilization X X X X o -
-
Relative price X X ^ X x:,
Relative cost a X -
■ f o ■ .',1
Relaf-ve quality r X
-
X X X
' Relative new product X X X
Real growth - X X X X X X
Relative sales force iexp X h- X ^ X
Relative advertising - X X . X X tT X
Relative image exp X X ^
r! - Change of ROI of all PIMS SBC s i: X _
\\ Yl
Prior growth rate -n X
„ Long'ttir* growth rate X
Industry concentration , - X X ' -
Economics of scale c X
Investment intensity (cap. req) X X X
Financial leverage X
Profit variability X
Non-diversifiable risk X
Firm size X X X
* Employees unionised r X
\i
Receivables and Inventory/rev X
Employee productivity X
Relative compsnsation X
t purchased from 3 suppliers X X
Relative product breadth X
Relative direct cost. .X; X
Manufacturing/revenue X
R s D/revenue - . 1 0 . X
r-H
Entry barriers " - X
Entry and exit of competition - X
Market share rank w X
1. Jacobson and Aaker (1985)
2. Ruraelt and Hensley (1981)
3. Bothwell ec al (1984) *
4. Bass et al (1978)
5. Phillips ec al (1983)
6. Prescott eC al (1986)
7. Shepherd (1972)
8". Buzzell and Hiersema (1981)
Table 2.3 - explanatory Factors In Market Share Models
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2.4 DYNAMICS OF MARKET SHARE ^
, .  " ' j - v z
ifhe relationship between market share "and 
% profitability is given greater depth by considering 
the effect of phanges in market share versus short 
> and long term changes in profitability. In theory, 
if mt ket share has value, it should be possible to 
"buy" market share by sacrificing current profits to 
obtain higher market share and later (presumably) 
b ° tap the benefits by obtaining higher profits. The 
converse should also be true i.e. high market share 
could be "sold" by allowing market share to decline 
while taking increased profit. According to this 
theory it should not be "impossible to simultaneously 
increase profit and market share.
Zeithaml and Fry (1984) investigated thisousing the 
PIMS data base and focused on the dynamics of 
changing market share in mature industrial 
businesses. Specifically their study explored 
concurrent changes in market share and prof itability 
between:
o  -
ID businesses realising simultaneous increases in 
market share and profitability (superstars) .
(2) businesses sacrificing market share to secure 
increases in profitability (harvesters).
(3) businesses building market share at the 
expense of profitability (builders).
(4) businesses that showed declines in both market 
share and profitability (decliners).
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Figure 2.7 shows the number of businesses' in each 
category; and the 'change in market share and ROI .
y*
Research FYamework, Descriptive Statistics, 
Dynamic Performance Situations 1
Chance in Relative Market Sliarc (ARMS)
Increasing + 1 - 1 Decreasing
Increasing
Change in 
Profitability 
(AROI) K
Decreasing
+3
~3
I. Superstars
n-106 
ARM S- 6.26 (6.97) 
AROI -10.21 (5.99)
II. Harvesters
fl-52
ARMS— 10.52 (14.25) . 
AROI -  7.04 (3.24)
[11. Builders
n —52 
ARMS- 7.57 (8.43) 
AROI — 8.22 (3.63)
IV. Dccliners
fl-84  r" rt 
ARMS— 11.15 (14.26) 
AROI -  -8.62 (4.06)
Figure 2.7 - Concurrent changes in market share and 
R O I
(Source : Zeithaml & Fry, 1984, p.845)
The first point which is of interest is the number 
of businesses which fall into the Superstar 
category, i.e. 106 out of 294 or 36%. These are 
businesses which simultaneously increased market 
share and profitability. Clearly this supports the 
theory that both market share and profitability 
depend on some spurious third factor and isv'fche case 
of Superstars the third factor improved causing both
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profit and market share to increase simultaneously. 
Also supporting this proposition,, diagonally 
opposite to the Superstars are Decliners which are 
the next largest number i.e. 84. Again, these are 
businesses which are obviously related via a 
spurious third factors as both profitability and 
market share declined simultaneously. The 
Superstars and Decliners. together make up 190 out of 
the 294 or 65%. (This result was supported by He any 
(1985) with the additional observation however that 
most of those gaining market share started with high 
market share and most of those losing market Share 
started with low market share!)
Ziethaml and Fry used a combination of environmental 
and strategic factors to investigate the differences 
between the four categories. Significant
differences were found. For example, contrary to 
Heany, Superstars were later entrants to their 
markets than were businesses in other performance 
situations. They had.less dominant positions in 
markets that were experiencing moderate growth. In 
terms of basic striWHgy, Superstars differentiated 
their products through higher price, quality and 
innovation. This innovation emphasised a higher 
percentage of new customised products, supported by 
a higher sales force expenditure.
Although this work of Ziethaml and Fry is 
interesting, of more importance for our purposes is 
the fact that well over half their sample seemed to 
have a spurious relationship between market share 
and profitability.
Another approach to the dynamics of market share has 
been to examine the order of entry compared to long
-,
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term survival or market share position (eg. Shaw and 
Shaw* 1984; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Urban, 
Carter, Gaskins and Mucha, 1986).
The argument here is that if market share has real 
worth then the firm that gets into the market first 
should retain an advantage over other firms that 
enter later, even years or decades after the initial 
entry. The theoretical models reviewed in this 
section assume that there is initially an 
environmental change which either by luck, good 
judgement or exceptional proficiency is exploited by 
a particular (first mover) firm. This competitive 
asymmetry is then strengthened and enhanced by 
mechanisms known as "isolating mechanisms" or 
"enhancing mechanisms" (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988, p.42).
Research done on the subject of first mover 
advantage has delivered varying results but in 
general findings have supported the view that there 
is a distinct advantage to first mover firms. 
Urban, Carter, GaSkin and Mucha (1986) studied 82 
brands of products across 24 categories and found 
that there was a significant market share penalty 
for late entrants. In reviewing the methodology the 
authors comment that, if anything their methodology 
underestimated the magnitude of the penalty but 
despite this they obtained a significant result.
Shaw and Shaw (1984) studied 13 major firms in the 
Western European synthetic fibres industry and 
examined hypotheses based on the BCG experience 
curve concept and on the PIMS evidence of the 
relationship between market share and profitability. 
They found significant evidence that late entrants
' - - - .. ^ \ 
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to a market suffered a competitive disadvantage 
because they lacked the accumulated experience of 
the pioneering firms. For each of the three main 
synthetic fibres; acrylic,: nylon and polyester, it 
was found that the early entrants who established 
major market shares early in the growth phase of the 
product life cycles were able to maintain that 
s leadership nearly twenty years later. Ih contrast 
, not only did almost" all the late entrants fail to 
achieve significant market shares but they provided 
seven out of nine market withdrawals. The authors 
also point out that:
"..: the results for the three synthetic
fibres are consistent - with ; the expectations 
derived from both PIMS* and experience curve
data. Firms with large market shares seemed
less vulnerable ... (in adverse market
conditions) ... than firms with small market 
shares. This was in spite of considerable 
product differentiation and consequent market 
segmentation. Firms which had acquired a '
large cumulative output reflected in 
persistent market leadership suryiv^ci, while 
some of the late entrants w^.th! , small 
rf; cumulative output had to Withdraw1 from the
■ market" .
(Shaw and Shaw, 1984, p.78)
Ghemawat (1984) examined the capacity expansion 
process in capital-intensive industries. A 
theoretical model was developed which led to the 
conclusion that where cost differed significantly
* The PIMS data refers to the relationship between market share and profitability 
reported by Schoeffler et al, 1974; Buzzell et al, 1975; Buzzell and Miersema, 1981.
Si
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across firms (because of Experience curve or other 
effects) the lowest cost producer will tend to pre- 
etnpt the others in addz/hg' new capacity thus 
entrenching a market leadership position. Part II 
of Ghemawat's paper examines the U.S. titanium 
dioxide industry in the context of the theoretical 
predictions of the model. In particular, Du Pont's 
strategy in titanium dioxide over the period 1972-77 
is examined and found to accord with the predictions 
of the model. 0 ,
The work of Ghemawat, Shaw and Shaw, and Urban et al 
clearly supports the view that market share has real 
worth and that market ^ leadership positions are of ten 
retained for decades. However research by Lieberman 
(1989) showed, to some extent, contradictory 
results.
Lieberman studied the entry and survival rates of 39 
chemical product industries in the United States. 
The data covered a 20 year period (starting in the 
early 60s) and the analysis focused on learning 
based cost advantages potentially held by incumbent 
firms. No evidence was found to support the view 
that entry decisions were sensitive tS the 
cumulative production lead held by incumbents. 
Further, entrant survival rates were found to be 
unrelated to order of entry. However, survival was 
adversely affected when the leading incumbent held 
a large cumulative output advantage, or when 
entrants built plants of sub-optimum scale. Thus, 
a large incumbent lead in production experience did 
not deter new entry but did reduce the entrants 
probability of survival. -
: " ■ . ,  ’
' 1 ~ )'
" ' f' It"" \
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Lieberman's work can be interpreted as supporting
the view that the market share profitability
‘ r relationship is context specific. It is this
author's view that the reason why: entrant survival
rates were not found to be related to order of entry
" in all „ cases is » because in certain
industry/contextual settings the o effect of
cumulative experience is much smaller than in other
contextual settings. In the former case, the
pioneering firm clearly gains very little
competitive advantage/from its initial high share
position and overtime is unlikely to have a large
difference in costs over later entrants. Also the
yulnerability of any particular firm in the industry
is likely to be approximately equal since no
advantages accrue from cumulative experience. In
the latter case, where cumulative experience causes
.. significant, cost reduction, clearly the pioneering
firm wi|.l have a cost position significantly lower
than other competitors. Also, via, pre-emptive
capacity expansion (as described by Ghemawat). the
pioneering^ firm is likely to increase its cumulative
\\ :
n experience advantage. In this case, as reported by 
Lieberman, entry may not be deterred but,survival 
rates of late entrants are likely tp be reduced.
A further indication that market share has real 
worth relates to the body of literature that exists 
concerning entry barriers. This discussion really 
forms part of the Industrial Organisation literature 
but, at this stage, it is sufficient to note that 
there is a large school of thought which holds that 
entry barriers allow the incumbent to earn above 
average profits. These entry barriers classically 
take the form of either installed capital capacity 
or ar cumulative production lead or both (see
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Schmalensee, 1981 of Gilbert, 1989). However, 
broadly speaking, an entry barrier can be any 
mechanism that shelters the incumbent from effective
competition from other entrants. , "
- . - ' ' ' " b
"Depending on the industry that you are in, it 
means that you're on the approved list, on the 
shelf, installed, imbedded in the specs."
,v  (Hanan, 1981, p64)
i»’eberman and Montgomery (1988, p41) identify 3
broad categories of what they refer to as isolating 
mechanisms: (1) technological leadership, (2) pre­
emption of assets, and (3) buyer switching costs. 
Within each category, there ire a number of specific 
mechanisms. ^
(1) Technological Leadership
Two basic mechanisms are considered in the 
literature. These are (a) advantages driven 
from the learning or experience curve, where 
costs fall with cumulative output and (b) 
success in patent R&D races, where advances in 
product or process technology ire functions of
0
i R&D expenditures.
jj (2) Pre-emption of scarce assets
ij Here, advantage may be gained by controlling
assets that already exist, rather than those 
created by the firm through development of new 
technology. Such assets may be physical 
resources or other process i! inputs. 
Alternatively, assets may relate to 
positioning in space, including geographical
'%  . . - ' - -:- :/\r
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space, product spaes,, shelf space, etc. Three 
specific types pf 'pre-emption are discussed in 
the literature (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 
p44) . These are - (a) pre-emption of iiip^ it^  
w factors, (b) pre-emption of locations space, 
and (c) pre-emptive investment in plant; and 
equipment . . y n - ,
(3) Switching costs and buyer choice under
uncertainty
With switching costs, late entrants must
invest extra resources to attract customers 
° awayffrom the incumbent firnL Several types
. of switching costs can arise, as pointed, out 
c, by Lieberman & Montgomery (1988, p46) .
„ "First switching costs can stem • from
initial transactions cost or investments 
that the buyer makes in adapting to the 
seller's product. These include the time 
and resources spent in qualifying a new 
supplier, the cost of ancillary products 
such as software for a new computer, and 
the? time, disruption, and financial 
burdens, of training employees. A second 
category of switching costs arises due to 
,  ^ supplier specific learning by the buyer. 
Over time, the buyer adapts to 
characteristics of the product and its 
supplier and thus finds it costly to 
change over to another brand (Wernerfelt, 
1985). For example, nurses become 
accustomed to the intravenous solution 
delivery systems of a given supplier and 
are reluctant to switch (Porter, 1980).
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-? A third type of switching cost is
contractual switching cost that may be 
intentionally created by the seller. 
Airline frequent-flyer programs fit in 
this category".
In this context, entry barriers can be thought 
of as a sheltering mechanism, a barrier to 
competition or a sort of marketing "inertia" 
which protects the incumbent from attacks by 
any other participant. A recognition of this 
"inertia" has led many authors (eg Porter, 
1985; Ward & Stzlsch, 1986 and Foster, 1986) to 
propose that the best time for attacking the 
market leader is at a time Of technological 
innovation or discontinuity. This proposition 
accepts that there are potent "inertia" forces 
- which an attacker would normally . have to 
overcome and which are disrupted during a 
technological {or other) discontinuity.
2.5 MICROECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION
No discussion of industry structure and market share
could be complete without drawing from the wealth
of information and knowledge embodied in the
literature on microeconomics and industrial
organisation. We will not attempt here to review
this literature in a holistic manner, as such a
review would be far too voluminous because of the
shear quantity of literature available and would in
any case be redundant as there are a number of 
■■'> • a
excellent texts on the subject (eg Bain, 1959;
Scherer, 1330; McGee, 1988). Instead we will draw
from the literature only the material required to
debate the specific subjects whichrare central to
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this research* We will start with a review of the
theory %f&^m6 k 3 poly power drawn from classical 
microeconomics and then move on to oligopoly models 
cost structures and in the next section game theory.
Monopoly Power
Monopoly has been called the perfect form of 
imperfect competition (van den Bogaerde, 1978, p347) 
"because not one of the conditions for perfect 
competition is complied with". In the debate of 
market share and profitability, monopoly clearly
represents one extreme i.e 1 0 0 % market Share
M G '
SAC
Fig. 2.8 Monopoly Price and Excess Profit in 
the Short term
(Source : Van Den Bogaerde, 1978, p351)
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Classical I microeconomics focuses - on price and
- I " ' " " '
quantity determination by monopolist in the Short,
medium and! long term. Fig 2.8 shows the
determination ;[df price and quantity over the short
to medium term. _ '
In the short term, the monopolist can vary his 
output within the framework Of his existing plant. 
The short term " cost curve (SAC) n and - the 
corresponding short term marginal cost curve (MC) in 
fig 2 . 8  have the same properties as the
corresponding curves of firms under conditions of 
perfect competition. The sales curve for the
^monopolist (equal to the market demand curve) is the 
average revenue curve CD and the corresponding 
marginal revenue curve MR is the curve CE. It can 
be shown that profit maximisation occurs at an 
n output where marginal costs equals, marginal revenue 
i.e at quantity OA. Seen graphically this means 
that the price charged will be represented by AB on 
fig 2 . 8  and the excess profit achieved by the 
monopolist is represented by the rectangle BFLK viz, 
excess price BF X volume OA.
The above analysis clearly shows that the monopolist 
uses market power to suppress the quantity produced 
and raise prices so that excess profits are made. 
This results in an inefficient resource allocation 
and the consumer is compromised. However it may be
argued that monopolies are necessary in order to
ilrealize economies of scale which could outweigh the 
negative effects of monopolies. The consequences 
are illustrated in fig 2 .9 .
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O utput
Fig 2.9 Monopoly with Econmnicie of Scale
(Source : Scherer, 1980, p22)
A  monopolist's long run average total cost curve is 
assumed to be LRATCm with associated marginal cost 
curve LRMCm. If, on the other hand, the industry 
were atomistically structured, with each member firm 
operating a plant designed to produce OF units of 
output at a unit cost of OPc, the long-run supply 
curve would be PcSc. Given these assumptions, the 
profit‘-maximizing monopolist (as per the previous
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analysis) produces output OXm which is higher than 
the 'Competitive supply OXc, ^and charges price AXm 
which is lower than the competitive price FXc. 
Clearly, it cannot be said that the consumer demands 
are satisfied less fully under monopoly in this case 
than they would be under competition.  ^ It is also 
worth noting that the monopolist still makes excess 
profits- as represented by the rectangle RBAPm.
Both of the foregoing analyses show that monopolies 
l! make excess profits but leave us with this
unresolved issue : do monopoly positions and their 
profits arise from economies of scale, or from the 
pursuit and exercise of market power? This question 
<s is important for this research as it specifies how
market share might effect profitability. It is also 
crucial in setting antitrust policy towards dominant 
firms, and lies at the core of Industrial, 
Organisation. If economies of scale were found to 
be large, they would pose an antitrust dilemma. 
Seeking to reduce monopoly power would entail a 
sacrifice of economies of,scale. However, we will 
postpone debate onrthis subject until the theories 
of oligopoly have-been reviewed. ; )
' The main feature of oligopoly as a market form is
that: the number of sellers is limited, so that firms 
are large relative to the extent of the market. 
Therefore, each seller has the ability to alter 
prices in the industry f) and an , action by one 
competitor has a direct effect on all other 
participants. Every oligopoly theory must therefore 
specify how each firm behaves and how it assumes 
others will behave. Non-collusive theories assume 
that each firm maximises its own profits, and does 
not agree with its rivals to fix prices or output.
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analysis) produces output OXm which is higher than 
the competitive supply OXc, and charges price AXm 
which is lower than the competitive price FXc. 
Clearly, it cannot be said that the consumer demands 
are satisfied less fully under monopoly in this case 
than they would be under competition. It is also 
worth noting that the monopolist still makes excess 
profits as represented by the rectangle RBAPm.
Both of the foregoing analyses show that monopolies 
make excess profits but leave us with this 
unresolved issue 1  do monopoly positions and their 
profits arise from economies of scale, or from the 
pursuit and exercise of market power? This question 
is important: for this rest arch as it specifies how 
market shar(b might effect profitability. It is also 
crucial in setting antitrust policy towards dominant 
firms, and lies at f he core of Industrial 
Organisation. If economies of scale were found to 
be large, they would pose an antitrust dilemma. 
Seeking to reduce monopoly power would entail a 
sacrifice of economies of scale. However, we will 
postpone debate on this subject until the theories 
of oligopoly have been reviewed.
The main feature of oligopoly as a market form is 
that the number of sellers is limited, so that firms 
are large relative to the extent of the market. 
Therefore, each seller has the ability to alter 
prices in the industry and an action by one 
competitor has a direct effect on all other 
participants. Every oligopoly theory 
specify how each firm behaves and I 
others will behave. Non-collusive t 
that?each firm maximises its own,profits, and does
must therefore 
ow it assumes 
Decries assume
not agree with its rivals to fix prices or output.
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The firms compete by searching for £he profit- 
■ maximizing quantity or price.
There are a number oil classical oligopoly theories 
and they are distinguished by their assumptions oh 
how each rival assumes the other participants will 
benave. Another distinction is whether each firm 
assumes that the other firms' prices or output will 
change as a result of competitive action. The
„ - founding theory, and the forerunner of all other
Lheories, is Cournot's theory, which assumes that 
the output quantity is the decision variable. We 
will now briefly review some of the more prominent 
oligopoly theories.
Cournot
In Cournot's theory, as in all oligopsony theory, 
what is Critical is the treatment of rivals' 
< 1 responses. Detailed specification of a -rival's
reaction is what distinguishes classical oligopoly 
theories from later theories. The classical 
theories postulate how rivals behave and how each 
assumes the other will behave. The later theories 
assume that all participants have a goal or 
objective (e.g. maximising the total industry 
profitability) then infer which kind of behaviour is 
best suited to each goal.
Cournot dealt with a homogeneous product sold in a 
perfect, centralizing market, and took output as the 
variable to be manipulated by each rival. Each 
seller, acting independently, seeking maximum 
profits. At. any moment each rival knows his own 
cost function, the total commodity demand, his own 
and his rival's output, and the market price. In
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short, h4 knows the present situation.
Cournot' s model has been viewed as the simultaneous 
solution of a system of equation and has also been 
extended to make it dynamic i,e have one firm move, 
then the other adjust and so on until equilibrium is 
reached. The model's assumptions are still valid 
under both Views but it is simpler to assume a 
simultaneous solution. r: ~
To describe the working of Cournot's model let us 
examine the simplest case of oligopoly where two 
firms sell identical products. Each firm seeks to 
maximise profits. Call the sellers 1 and 2, the 
totals cost functions Cx and C2, and the total 
revenue function TRX and TR2. They compete : Market 
price depends on the sum of their outputs, and a 
larger quantity sold by one firm leaves less for the 
other (at a particular price).
In Cournot's system, each seller assumes that the 
sum of his rivals' output will not change because he 
changes his own. Each seller takes as his own that 
part of the industry demand curve not satisfied by 
rivals. As a consequence, equilibrium comes through 
the sum of output decisions independently made, 
which is brought to v".quality with industry demand. 
In equilibrium, the market clears on price and no 
seller can independently improve his position.
Under these conditions price will be some function 
of the output of the two firms in the market.
P = F (qi*,q2>
1 -I ■ 1
And for each firm, total revenue is the market price 
times its own output rate.
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\ TRX = qi F (qx + q2) " ,
TR2 = q2 F (qi + %)
Profit for eWch firm, R, is v:otal revenue minus 
total cost.
Rx = TRX (qx + q2) - Cx (qx) and 1
- R2 = TR2 (qx + q2) - C2 (q2)
To find each firm/ s profit - maximizing output we 
differentiate (and set to zero) the profit function 
of each firm with respect to its own output rate q. 
dRi / dqx = [dTRx (qx, q2) / dqx] +
[dTR. (qx,q2) / dq2 ] [dq2 / dqx] -
dCx (qx) / dqx = 0 \ _ 1
"  '  -  L  i '
' W  ' - - 'And similarly!; for the second firm.
For each firm the second term has two elements one
of which, dq2 /dqx, shows how each firm/s output is
assumed to alter the output of the other firm.
These derivatives are called conjectural variations 
and assumptions concerning them are the
distinguishing feature of the various oligopoly 
theories. In Cournot's 1838 version firms act as 
though dq2 / dqx is zero and thus we have :
dRx/dqx = [dTRx (qx,q2 )/dqx ]-dCx (qx) /dqx = 0 
dR2 / dq2 = [dTR2 (qx, q2) dq2 ]-dC2 (q2) dq2 = 0
Putting these functions into shape to solve for qx 
and q2, respectively, gives two reaction functions, 
one for each firm. The Cournot equilibrium solution 
is then obtained by solving the reaction functions 
simultaneously. ’ /
As an illustration, assume a linear demand function
and a linear cost function for each firm, i; Market
' 1
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„ price is determined by the sum of outputs.
i.e P=2b0-q1 -q2° (assume)
For simplicity, assume that the total cost function 
for both firms are identical. »
„ 1 0 q, and
c2 = lOqj
Using the above argument ^
= (2 0 0 -q1 -q2 )q1 -1 0 q1 '
fr dF-i/dqx = 190-2q1-q2 = 0
Similarly for 2 ; , ‘ - -
dR2 /dq2 = 19ci-2q2-q1 = 0 
17 Solving the equations simultaneously gives 
q2 — q2 — 63,3 _ and
P = 200 - 63,3 - 63,3 =73,3
 ^ - Cournot' s analysis can be extended to far more 
complicated cases and can handle many competitors 
with differing cost functions.. For a more detailed 
discussion of Cournot oligopoly see Daughety (1988) . 
For our purposes it is worth noting that the price 
determined under Cournot's system is not equal to 
the marginal cost of the participants but is always 
greater than the marginal cost and is dependent on 
the number of participants in the oligopoly and on 
the price elasticity of demand. It can be shown 
(McGee, 1988, p 6 6 ) that the price under the Cournot 
system is given by :
^ P = MC-P / (He)
where MC= marginal costs
N = number of participants 
e = demand elasticity which is negative 
for a decreasing demand function
Clearly, price will only be equal to marginal costs 
in the limiting case where N or e tend tq, infinity.
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Also, it has been shown that for a linear market 
deniand, a single firm monopoly produces one-half as 
much as an industry under perfect competition, 
Cournot duopoly is two-thirds, the competitive 
output, triopoly is three-forths, and so On. Since 
the demand function is assumed to be linear the 
following can be implied about prices and (assuming 
cost functions remain unchanged) profits. y
Assuming a demand function of the form
P = P0 -qc where p„, C are constants. ;
Number
of
Parti­
cipants
Proportion
of
competitive 
quantity q
Price Price
premium
over
competi
-tive
price
Average 
.Market 
Share
. 1 % Po-Mqc X qc 1 0 0 %
2 : 2A Po-2/3qc \ Vs qc 50%
3 V, Po-3/4qc qc 33%
4 4A Po-4/sqC V,qc 25%
5 5A Po-s/6qc v , & 2 0 %
i Po-qc 0  1 " 0 %
It can be shown that €he profit tojj sales ratio is 
proportional to the price premium, and therefore the 
relationship between profitability and market share 
for a cross-sectional study of different industries 
should be as shown in the last two columns of the 
above table. This is worth noting for the following 
reasons : i
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(I) There is a positive relationship between 
market share and profitability despite the 
> fact that cost functions were assumed to be 
l identical (i.e no economics of scale assumed)..
(ii) The relationship is not linear.
0 For the purposes of this study, the abOve is by far 
the most important conclusion arising out of 
oligopoly theory. There are many other oligopoly 
theories which use COurnot's model as a basis but 
with different assumptions concerning the 
conjectural variations. For example :
Bertrand and Edgeworth developed various oligopoly 
models using price as the decision variable. Also 
the doniinant - f irm theories of Forchheimer and 
ypn Stackelberg are relevant, .In Von Stackelberg's 
theory, one firm is the leader and the other the 
follower. The follower acts exactly like a Cournot 
duopilist and the conjunctural variation term is 
zero for the follower. It assumes, correctly, that 
the follower always takes the leaders output to be 
constant, therefore assuming that dq1 /dq£ = 0. The 
leader knows that this is how the follower will 
behave and therefore the leader can choose hispown 
output (which indirectly determines the follower's 
output) to maximise his profits. To do this the 
-leader enters the follower's reaction function into 
his own profit function substituting it for the q£ 
term that appears there. The substitution makes the 
leader's profit solely a function of his own^output 
- which can be duly maximised.
Although there are many more* variations of the 
models discussed and many other models including
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0 those of Chamberlain and Feliner -the results 
/produced by the models as far ai‘ market share and 
^^profitability are concerned are not markedly 
- different from the Cournot model. The concepts 
■~l(j relating to the construction of some of these models 
will be discussed further in the next section on 
Game Theory« Of more immediate interest to the
-  - - " ' 'n . "(s'
theme of this research is the findings of the 
industrial organisation literature with respect to 
industry concentration and its relationship to 
profitability.
Industry concentration is a topic which lies at the 
& heart of industrial Organisation as a discipline and 
has been subjected to vigorous debate. In essence, 
classical economists believe that highly 
concentrated industries act like monopolies causing 
excess prof its , to be made in the indiivxtry And 
(worse) reduced output resulting in consumers being 
deprived of goods they would . otherwise have. 
However, the results obtained from various empirical 
studies and the conclusions drawn by various authors 
are by no means unanimous in denouncing highly 
concentrated industriesR There are a number of 
factors which contribute to the contradictory 
findings that have been reported. These include :
1 (i) 1 There are many different Ways of
: measuring industry concentration and
frequently changing the way industry 
concentration is measured can completely 
nullify the results obtained from a 
particular'study (see for example McGee,
,1988, p328, where itris shown that Bain's 
work on concentration can be completely 
nullified by taking different measures of
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Concentration)
(ii) There is no agreement between the various
researchers concerning base hypotheses,
, models , included explanatory variables or 
research methodology. This leads to 
research findings’ being highly’ 
specialised and makes comparisons^ of 
studies impossible.
(iii) There is also, of course, the real point 
. at issue viz. are industries concentrated 
because larger firms are more efficient 
p and therefore earn higher profits while
at the same time discouraging new entry, 
or, are concentrated industries 
, responsible for increasing prices and 
applying monopoly povver? This-,-is,, the 
issue of really major theoretic and 
practical importance which lies at the 
core of Industrial Organisation.
In addressing this issue, McGee (1988, pp304-310) 
identifies four hypothetical cases and constructs 
models to examine the hypotheses in detail. These 
are: "
1. Oligopoly lowers cost without affecting price. 
Under these conditions McGee clearly shows 
that the oligopoly makes excess profits which 
precisely measure the value of resources saved 
through the greater efficiency of the 
oligopoly. Under these conditions producers 
are better off and consumers equally well off.
2. Oligopoly lowers cost and price. Under these
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conditions both consumers and producers are 
better off due to the improved efficiency of 
the oligopoly over pure competition. 
Obviously these oligopolies are beneficial to 
the economy as a whole.
3. Oligopoly lowers costs, raises prices. This 
is the so-called "mixed trade-off case" which 
is supported by Cournot's theory. Under these , 
conditions the producer is better of-f but the 
consumers less well off than would be the case 
under pure competition. If welfare is 
measured as the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus then (according to McGee, 1988, p307)
* it would not be surprising if „ a Cournot 
oligopoly turned out to be allocatively 
superior to pure competition.
4. Oligopoly price higher, costs the same. This 
is the most common and influential case of all 
trade-off cases and the ones quoted in text 
books. In this case, atomistic competition 
and oligopoly have identical costs and offer 
the same product, yet oligopoly price is 
raised above the competitive price. Thus the 
excess profit earned by the oligopoly is at 
the direct expense of the consumers. There is 
also an amount of reduced production which is 
lost to consumers but not translated into 
excess profits for the oligopoly. However, 
McGee points out, that unless entry is closed 
by law it is not obvious that this case is of 
any practical importance.
The above represent four possible options as to how
oligopolies (or highly concentrated industries)
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could influence, the market. There is much debate in 
the literature about which is the most commonly 
occurring case with two strong, schools of thought 
emerging - those who believe case 1  or 2  occur most 
often and those who believe case 3 or 4 occur most 
often. r.
The core of the debate centres around the efficiency 
differences between firms and especially whether 
larger firms are more efficient than smaller firm -
i.e whether economics of scale are significant.
In the early 70s most economists were of the vfew 
that "concentration" breeds monopoly performance" 
which is called the "structuralist" point of view. 
In 1974, Professor Leonard Weiss, a structuralist, 
reviewed in detail 81 published statistical studies 
about how structure and performance are related.
I
With few exceptions a positive, statistically 
significant relationship between concentration and 
profitability was claimed. More decisively, Weiss 
(1989) examined the effect of industry concentration 
on price. Weiss' data is impressive and covers 
markets separated by location within the USA 
(cement, airlines, banking services, retailing), by 
time (auctions) , or by the'price of inputs (labour, 
beef). As Weiss points out, although the studies 
are "somewhat specialised, we feel that the effect 
of all these studies taken together is greater than 
their simple sum"
(Weiss, 1989, pi).
Weiss reviews 121 data sets and finds a significant 
positive effect of concentration on price in 62,8% 
of the data sets compared to only 3,3% of the data 
sets showing a significant negative effect (the rest
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were insignificant - see,-,figure 2 . 1 0  for; details)/.
V  , Number of Data Sets w ith
\ x - ' ■ - -
■Indusby/or study
Number 
of data 
sets ; R
Significant 
positive 
effects {,
Non­
significant
positive
effects
Non­
significant
negative
effects
Significant 
negative ' 
effects
Cement 7 5 2
Orange in 
concentration
3 2 . 1 . : .
■ - - ;
Auctions 6 6
ft ;
Unions 2 2
Change in CR 
Germany (prices) 1 I Ci
EEC (margins) 5* 3* n ; 1* i* ft n
Advertising space 
and time ' ^
’ 7 2 2 1
Airlines 9
Gas stations ° 26 VO 5 1
Supermarkets 2 ■
Rail freight rates I 3
Banking 49 21 20 7 1
Beef purchases V l b
Total 121 76 30 11 4
Percentage of total 62.8 2 4 / ; .  f 9.1 3-3
a. Change in price-cost margin dependent.
b. Buying price so negative coefficient expected and found.
Fig 2.10 Effect of Industry Contraction on 
Price
.TV- (Source : Weiss, 1989, p267)
In his theoretical argument Weiss reviews the work 
done by Bradly and Gale (1982) in which the effect 
of concentration disappeared when market share was 
introduced and found it :
a . _
"Less convincing than it might have been 
because they used only concentration and 
market share in their analysis"
(Weiss, 1989, p 8 )
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Incredibly, Weiss does not; include market share as 
an explanatory variable in any of - the studies 
reported on, and, once again, thdre is ho 
commonality of method or models between any of the 
studies - thus making comparisons difficult. 
Despite these shortfalls Weiss' work does point to 
a positive correlation - between price and 
concentration. ^
v Shepherd (1983) examined monopoly profits with the 
express purpose of evaluating the significance of 
economies of scale, as opposed to market power. 
Shepherd accepted the existence" of a correlation 
between market share and profitability and quotes 
his earlier study as the source (Shepherd, 1972). 
The difference between the cost of capital (assumed 
to be independent of market share and; the actual 
profit is ascribed by Shepherd to "monopoly power" 
n. (see fig 2 .1 1 ) . ; ^
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\ (Source : Shepherd, 1983, pl 7 i)
i Shepherd's data covered large ti.S industrial firms 
during 1^60-1969 and the following methodology was
Used:
1. Firms with market shares of over 20% were 
identified. .
2 . Deviations in relative cross-efficencies and 
innovativeness were estimated.
I  *
3. Measures for actual scale economies were 
- applied.
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4. Cost effects of scale economies were isolated, 
and, _ ;
- : : ' ■ : ’ . ; . ;  ■■ 7 ;  : ; -  ■
^  ' 5. Economies of scale compared to other profit 
. . sources. tr
A total of 85 firms were analized and the conclusion 
reached is that :
' ___i!___
"Economy of scale provided little efficiency basis 
for market shares above 20%, in a variety of U.Sl 
industrial markets in the 1960s".
(Shepherd, 1983, pl96)
-  ' . ' ■ V  i .. \
- On the other hand, based on an in-depth study of 2.5| 
manufacturing industries in the UK, Pratten (1971, 
p313) find? hat there are "important economies of 
scale in many industries",.. This, view is supported 
by McGee, who, rafter reviewing the empirical
evidence, comes! to the conclusion that:
: ",
"concentrated industries tend to be more 
profitable partly because firms with larger 
shares have lower costs, and partly because, 
for one reason or another, their prices have 
remained above their own costs - at least for 
a while"
(McGee, 1988, p341)
McGee argues that within competitive industries and 
cartels alike, more efficient firms can be expected 
to become larger and more profitable. Unless they 
are more efficient, dominant firms or cartels of 
larger firms should have lower profit rates than 
smaller, outside firms that compete against them. 
Neither collusion nor conclusive oligopoly should be
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expected to make larger firms more profitable than 
smaller firms, unless they are more efficient. 
McGee believes that economists have been slow in 
accepting efficiency" as an explanatory factor and 
points out. r, - '
"It may seem strange that industrial 
Organisation so long ignored superior 
efficiency as a possible explanation of 
' differences in profitability . t >  the 
competition, cartel, dominant "v firm, and" 
Cournot models - all of the price models in 
fact - predict that lower cost firms will have 
larger market shares and higher profits" o 
: ' ; (McGee, 1988, p334)
In other words McGee suggests that the causality 
works the other way around. Lpvr cost causes 
increased profitability which results in increased 
investment and therefore growth in market share. 
Where there are economies of scale present this 
process would obviously be accelerated and 
multiplied.
Clearly some economists (e.g Weiss) have not taken 
McGee's view regarding differences in efficiency and 
economies of scale and the controversy continues. 
For the purpose of this research it is worth noting 
that despite more than 50 years of debate and 
empirical study the two schools of thought continue 
and the issue remains unsettled.
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